How Russia’s military, diplomatic, and economic roles in the Mediterranean have developed in recent years
Hindered by an array of domestic and international obstacles and competing regime priorities, the Syrian government’s efforts to attract regional capital for investment and reconstruction will be insufficient.
Public international law—tied as it is to existent western-centric neo-colonial structures—will likely block the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean from benefiting regional states.
Will the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries lead to regional transformation?
Turkey is at one end of competing geostrategic visions in the Eastern Mediterranean, but are there avenues for reconciliation with countries at the opposite pole?
In the last half-century, Egypt has had to negotiate its way through the Arab–Israeli peace process, regional nuclear proliferation, and domestic political transition. What has it taught us?
The president’s concentration of executive power has left Turkey vulnerable to decisions based more on saving the economy—and thus his own skin—than on stopping the COVID-19 pandemic.
From a political economy perspective, there are four key forces working against the peace and prosperity of Middle Eastern and North African states. To defeat them, robust institutions are essential.
The United States has been the world’s cultural giant since the twentieth century—but is its supremacy and soft power being challenged by Bollywood, Dizi, and K-Pop?
Hours after U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled his plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, the reactions of key regional figures ranged from hopeful to enraged.
Erdoğan wanted to build a “neo-Ottoman” empire but missed out on what is strategically most important—real influence in the Middle East
Extreme instability has prompted a fundamental reconfiguration of the contemporary Middle East; as the old order crumbles, a new one has yet to emerge
How Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan went from being a regional Islamist leader in the Arab Spring to being the Middle East’s odd man out
Understanding Turkey’s diplomatic moves post-2011 by looking back to the Ottoman conception of ittihad-i Islam
Can the Kurds, the largest ethnicity in the Middle East without their own nation, overcome their internal disunity and find ways to exist as an independent state or as autonomous regions?
Divisions among the states vested in Syria are opening possibilities for Syria’s Kurds to secure greater protection for their autonomy.
Instead of putting its full strength behind unifying Syrian rebel groups, Ankara is slowly supporting that process without disturbing the status quo.
In Northeast Africa today, Middle Eastern states vie for influence, and African governments accede—with conditions
In Idlib, Turkey could deter Russian airstrikes and ensure the region remains out of the Syrian regime’s control by going after extremist groups.
There is hypocrisy in Europe’s migration policies, which give lip service to human rights, but actually push back those seeking access to better lives.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s policy toward Syrian refugees could become his downfall as anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey grows, especially if the economy weakens.
Turkey and the European Union signed a “Refugee Deal” to curb migration into Europe. But unfulfilled provisions of the deal are leading to problematic EU–Turkey relations.
Turkey’s opposition parties have moderated their ideologies and coordinated their strategies to collectively win more votes in the upcoming elections, which could deal a blow to the ruling AKP.
How can we upturn narratives about the Arab Spring uprisings?
The geopolitical ripples around Operation Olive Branch raise questions about Ankara’s ability to achieve its goal of preventing the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish entity in northwestern Syria.
Former secretary general of the League of Arab States, Amre Moussa, offers eight recommendations for establishing a new regional order that would see Arab countries end instability and regain control of their futures.
The Assad regime has won the war; it cannot, however, win the peace.
Turkey’s military incursion into Kurdish-controlled northern Syria risks straining diplomatic ties and exposing Turkey to increased terror threats.
Though challenges remain, Turkey is pushing forward with efforts to integrate Syrian students and teachers into its education system.
Despite tensions over Syria, Turkey is increasingly turning to Russia to secure its foreign and domestic policy needs.
It’s tempting to blame the country’s recent slide into repression on President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s thirst for personal power. But did the ruling Islamist party ever really abandon the country’s long tradition of state authoritarianism?
After Turkey’s constitutional referendum, it is increasingly apparent that its government is exhibiting similar authoritarian tendencies to Egypt since 2013.
Turkey’s failed coup attempt suggests the military’s political role has reached a nadir, but politicization of the institution continues.
However you look at the violence in Turkey, the fallout is to President Erdogan’s advantage.
Supporting Kurdish groups in Syria could empower them to play a role in resolving regional conflicts, not just in Syria but also in Iraq and Turkey.
President Erdogan’s scare tactics may have pushed the country further towards a conflict neither Kurdish rebels nor the Turkish army can win.
Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party successfully convinced a cross-section of voters that it was the only party able to maintain domestic security.
Turkey’s AKP now seems prepared to do almost anything to stay in power. Once hailed as a democratic model for the Middle East, the government has veered towards authoritarianism.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu impresses the world with his grasp of geopolitical theory and zest for putting it into practice. During an in-depth exchange with the Cairo Review, he discusses the direction of the Arab revolts, Turkey’s future in Europe, the “golden age” of U.S.-Turkish relations, and much more.