Rebuilding from Rubble: The Future of Gaza

Amid the dust and rubble, the new ceasefire offers relief to a war-ravaged Gaza; hope remains for a bright future in the Strip as questions surface of the role civil servants formerly employed by Hamas will play in governance

The ceasefire put in place by the Trump Administration to end Israel’s war in Gaza faces numerous challenges. Since the ceasefire went into effect, Israeli forces bombed Gaza on October 29, killing 104 people, claiming an Israeli soldier was killed in Rafah. The usual cornucopia of blame was fired between Israel and Hamas with the former accusing the militant group of breaching the ceasefire, and the latter denying any involvement. Israel has also condemned Hamas for failing to return the bodies of all the deceased hostages. Hamas says it does not have the required heavy machinery to find the corpses under mountains of rubble. In the meantime, clashes between Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups and families have left at least 27 dead since the ceasefire took hold.

Despite these setbacks, both Israel and Hamas have publicly reiterated their commitment to the ceasefire and the agreement remains in place. Israel has allowed humanitarian aid into the Strip, the living hostages were returned, and Israeli troops have partially withdrawn from sections of the Strip.

One of the most pressing challenges—assuming the ceasefire holds—is Gaza’s need for new leadership to guide the Strip through the difficult task of rebuilding a city reduced to rubble. Omar Shaban, founder and director of the Gaza-based Palthink for Strategic Studies, remains optimistic for the future despite the pressing challenges.

The ceasefire has faced many challenges, but it’s still holding. What is keeping the agreement from collapsing? 

The long-awaited ceasefire is holding largely due to international support. Without the commitment of the international community and the pressure of the U.S. administration, this ceasefire wouldn’t have lasted more than a few days.

There  has been a shift of power among the stakeholders, particularly regarding Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt. Qatar and Turkey have been hosting Hamas’ financial and political representatives, and Hamas listens to them more than the people in Gaza, who have been pleading for a ceasefire for months. Hamas only came to the table for this most recent ceasefire once Qatar and Turkey told them to.

But Qatar and Turkey were too close with Hamas and Israel bombed Doha. So they could not negotiate the ceasefire at the end of the day. When the U.S. pushed for a ceasefire, it went to Egypt instead. 

Once Qatar and Turkey realized that the U.S.-brokered ceasefire would land in Egypt, they chose to go to Cairo to be involved in the decision-making process. The Egyptians want to harvest this success, they see it as an opportunity to shift the political capital of the Middle East away from the Gulf and toward Cairo.

What about the agreement itself? Was it well-made, or is it flimsy? 

It’s not very good, but it’s realistic. I say it’s not very good because it would have been better if Hamas had negotiated the end of the war during the ceasefire we had from January to March, when it held more living hostages and a better bargaining position. Instead, Hamas ignored the voices of the Palestinians begging for the end of the war and prolonged the conflict, leading to another 20,000 deaths between April and October, and the continued Israeli destruction of the Strip.

Any ceasefire which follows two years of war is expected to have challenges. For example, we have already seen problems with the Rafah crossing being closed and aid being blocked by Israel. But in those cases, the United States intervened and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu obeyed and opened the crossing for aid to enter.

There are still problems, though. The Rafah crossing is allowing aid in, but not allowing people out who desperately need medical treatment. Additionally, there have been problems finding the remaining bodies of the deceased hostages, likely because many are trapped under the 60 million tons of rubble covering the Strip. But I don’t believe these issues are enough to make either side abandon the ceasefire.  

What do the Palestinians in Gaza think about the arrangement? 

A primary concern for the Palestinians in Gaza is how much of Hamas will remain in the coming months. The ceasefire agreement stipulated that Hamas would disarm and allow a new security force to take over the Strip. However, this change will not be immediate. 

I think President Trump agreed to allow Hamas to remain in the Strip to ‘clean the house’, so to speak. I believe there will be a two-month bridge period where Hamas will remain in power to disarm those Gazan families still holding weapons, subdue other armed groups in the Strip, and prepare for its own disarmament.

So, Hamas will be completely gone in the next few months? 

Well, keep in mind that Hamas is more than just a resistance group, it is also a government that has run Gaza since 2006. Everyone employed in the government is also technically affiliated with Hamas. Beyond the al-Qassam brigades, the military branch who fight Israel, by my estimation there are 20-25,000 people employed by Hamas in health, education, and infrastructure. These people are very important to include in the post-war plans because they know how to run the city. 

In my opinion, no Hamas members will be present in any future government or security force, but these public servants who were employed by Hamas must be involved in rebuilding Gaza. Also, including these members will help them accept the new order after the war. Many of these members are already known to the Israeli government and will be screened for approval by Israel for the new administration.   

Okay, so there will be some returning figures from Hamas’ government who know how to run a city. But who will manage the security? 

I am confident Hamas will not be a military presence once it hands over the Strip in the next two months, but Gaza still needs a security force to maintain order. Hamas had previously employed a police force of nearly 40,000 officers by my estimate, who were not involved in armed resistance. How many remain alive after two years of war remains to be seen and the returning police officers will need new training on how to run the Strip in the absence of Hamas.

Who will train them? 

I think there will likely be an agreement with neighboring Arab states, such as Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan, to send a few hundred professional police officers to Gaza. They will help reorient the police in Gaza to see their roles as serving the Palestinian people, not Hamas. Since many of these officers joined Hamas for jobs rather than ideology, they will likely understand this new arrangement.

There are more issues beyond just the police, however. Some large Palestinian families have weapons and hold significant influence over the working of the city and may challenge the authority of the new police force. No Arab state would agree to send their own police officers to the Strip if there is a possibility they may be threatened by other armed groups or families in Gaza, or by the Israelis.

So there are other armed groups and families beyond Hamas that could pose a problem. How will that be resolved?

In my opinion, the recent fighting between Hamas and other armed groups since the ceasefire began is Hamas’ attempt to ‘clean house’ so a new security force can take over. This is not from any official source, it’s just my reading of the situation, but I think there is some agreement wherein Hamas is forcing powerful families and groups to hand over their weapons so they can’t attack the new security force.

So in the short term, it seems the pre-existing city employees from the Hamas government will help carry out the logistics of rebuilding the city, and a new police force will maintain order. What about the long-term?

I see two phases. First, a two-year interim of technocratic leadership supported by the international board outlined in the ceasefire. Second, an elected government voted in at some point during 2027.

There are three conditions for a successful transitional government. First, an interim committee, consisting of fifteen administrators, must be entirely independent and professional with no political ties. The administrators must be screened and approved by the key stakeholders: Israel, the United States, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt. Second, the committee must have access to financial support from stakeholders to enact the rebuilding process. Third, the community in Gaza must accept this new committee; this can be achieved by providing tangible support, like securing food supplies, providing medical care, and establishing stability.

After two years, I hope we will have an election.

Gaza hasn’t had an election since 2006. Are you worried about what that might mean for the success of the new government?

There are certainly challenges. About 68 percent of the Gazan population are under 30 years old, which means two or three generations have never cast a vote. The West Bank does not offer a good example of effective democracy, either. Palestinians see the Palestinian Authority as corrupt and ineffective, so it is not a good template for a new government.

Despite that, civil society is not absent from Gaza, and organizations like PalThink offer education on the logistics of running a government, promote non-violence, and offer practice sessions simulating parliamentary sessions. I have spent years training young people in Gaza and I am confident in their abilities. 

How do you think the Palestinians in Gaza will respond to this new post-war order? 

The most important thing is to give the people hope. If we can spend two years rebuilding Gaza, getting people the support they need, and give them hope for a better future with a new election, then they will see they have more options than violence.

But this hope is not guaranteed. We need continued international support, even after Gaza fades from the headlines of global news. There are nearly forty thousand orphans in Gaza who saw their parents die before their eyes. We must give them reason to believe there is a better future waiting for them.

Much of the global discourse on the war has been about the issue of Palestinian determination and statehood. Do you think this ceasefire will lead to this?

I don’t think that is the question the Palestinians in Gaza are concerned with, actually. After two years of war the priority is to create a sustainable life. We want to survive and rebuild. We’re just like any other people. We want things like healthcare, infrastructure, schools, insurance. 

In the past, Israel has employed a “divide and conquer” technique to keep Gaza subdued and the West Bank disempowered. Do you think Israel will really allow Gaza the chance to progress?

There are two schools within Israel that have existed since the Oslo Accords. One camp, which was led by Shimon Peres, believed at the time that a rich and prosperous neighboring Gaza would bring stability to Israel. This group believed that they cannot live nicely while their neighbor lives poorly. The second camp believed that Gaza must be subjugated, kept under Israeli control and restricted from progress. The second camp has been in charge for a long time. 

I believe the first camp is becoming more popular. I think the Israelis are realizing there is a benefit to having a prosperous neighbor, both in terms of stability and business. With international funding, Gaza could become very attractive to Israeli businessmen. I can see Gaza becoming like Dubai, with its location as a port, beautiful coast, and access to oil. I am very optimistic about the future of Gaza right now, I think it has the potential to become very successful.

The Cairo Review of Global Affairs
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