Israel’s war on Gaza is approaching the end of its second year. As global accusations of genocide mount, European states have increasingly voiced support for recognizing a Palestinian state. Meanwhile, Arab states have been pushing for the creation of a Palestinian state for decades. On the other hand, some Arab states, in addition to Egypt and Jordan that normalised political relations in the 80s and the 90s, engaged in the Abraham Accords with Israel starting in 2020, even though Israel had made no movement toward the creation of a Palestinian state.

Why does this contradiction from the Arab states exist? And in light of what’s happening in Gaza, what does it mean for the future of Palestine? To discuss these questions, the Cairo Review interviewed Dr. H.A. Hellyer, an academic and intellectual who researches the politics and geopolitics of the contemporary Middle East at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies in London, and the Center for American Progress in Washington DC.

Abigail Flynn: Hello, Dr. Hellyer, thank you for joining me today for this episode of CR Amplified to discuss the issue of Palestinian statehood.

We’ve seen the issue of establishing a Palestinian state referenced again and again by Arab states, but we also saw many of these same states normalize relations with Israel in the absence of any true movement toward that objective from the Israelis, as we saw with the Abraham Accords. So my first question is: why do the Arab states bring up the issue of Palestinian statehood so often?

Hellyer: It’s a pleasure to be on the podcast for your listeners. Once upon a time, I was a professor at AUC, which feels like a very long time ago—when my beard was maybe more black than white and gray. But it was a lovely time, and I’m always happy to be back, virtually or otherwise.

Your question, if I understand correctly, is: why are Arab states focusing more on this? Is that what you were getting at?

AF: Yes, yes.

Hellyer: So, I perhaps have a bit of a controversial view when it comes to this particular question, because I think that a good part of what is pushing this current drive to recognize a Palestinian state is actually something of a betrayal of weakness and an admittance of a lack of power.

Because the fact is, it’s not about whether or not a Palestinian state is recognized. 

It’s about whether the Israeli occupation of the territories that would be governed by a Palestinian state ends; and, more immediately, that the horrific and devastating war on Gaza by the Israelis stops. I have legal training, so I’m loath to jump ahead of the International Court of Justice when it comes to this particular question. But let’s be very clear: the definition of genocide, and the tests for claiming this is a genocide, are pretty blatant and transparent. 

It’s extremely troubling to see people get so hung up on this issue of recognition, when, really, this could be a trap. I say “could be a trap”, because what we have is a huge amount of political effort being put into this recognition point. My concern is that people would then recognize the state of Palestine, but not do anything to bring it into existence. 

This would be very similar to how the Oslo Accords worked out, in the sense that there were the accords, but there were no mechanisms for accountability when people—in particular, the Israelis—broke international law or violated the accords themselves. So, what you had was this constant expression of support for the peace process and for the Palestinians, but no actual policy that meant there were consequences to the Israelis doing what they were doing. Unfortunately, we’ve seen much of that over the past two years, and this is why I say [recognition] could turn out to be a trap.

Now, I hope it will be a trap that people will jump into, and then jump out of—in the sense that they will actually follow through and say: okay, these nations all recognize the state of Palestine; now they actually have to do something to end the occupation of it.

But keep in mind, I think it’s around 150 states out of around 185 at the UN that already recognize a state of Palestine. This will be a bit different, because these are some of the more powerful states in Europe that will now recognize the state of Palestine. So, it does make a difference in that regard.

But if France, the UK, and these other countries that recognize the state of Palestine do not take action to ensure that recognition means there will actually be a state—i.e. that the occupation will end—then I think it will be very symbolic, and stop there. 

Now, it will be symbolic and there will be other things that can happen as a result; but I don’t think anybody should assume that simply by recognizing the state of Palestine it’s going to be a game changer in the short to medium term. On the contrary, it could turn out badly.

The former Israeli ambassador to France, retired, writing a letter in Le Monde to President Macron, said: “Mr President, if immediate sanctions are not imposed on Israel, you will end up recognising a cemetery.” He was saying you have to do something; you have to make sure that there are consequences.

This is why I say I think this push kind of betrays a bit of weakness, because it should go hand in hand with arms embargoes and with massive sanctions. And so far, we’ve not seen that.

AF: Thank you, Dr. Hellyer. So in line with this understanding of people or states pushing for recognition of statehood, and yet not complementing that with any real policy action, looking toward the Arab states again: why were so many of them willing to normalize relations with Israel, despite Israel consistently dismissing the idea of establishing a Palestinian state?

Hellyer: I kind of question the premise of the question, because I don’t think that you have a big normalization push going on right now. On the contrary, any idea that there would be a broadening of normalization of the Israelis in the region, I think, is a fallacy.

I think that when it comes to the Saudis, they’ve made it very clear they’re not normalizing until there’s a Palestinian state. When it comes to the Syrians, there’s absolutely no indication that they’re going to normalize. What they may do is simply return to the 1974 agreement, which basically freezes relations in a place that means that the Israelis stay out of Syria other than the occupied Golan Heights. But normalization is a pipe dream when it comes to the Syrians, at least for the medium to long term.

Same thing with the Lebanese. When people talk about further normalization, they’re usually talking about the Saudis, the Syrians, and the Lebanese. And I don’t think there’s any possibility that that’s going to happen anytime soon at all.

The last time the Israelis normalized relations with any part of the Arab world was through the Abraham Accords. And during the Abraham Accords, even though nobody really thought that Netanyahu wanted a Palestinian state, he never actually said so.

The Emiratis normalized, or at least recognized the state of Israel during the Abraham Accords in 2020, for strategic reasons of their own. It wasn’t about the Palestinians. There was the claim that this stopped the annexation of the West Bank. I don’t think that was the main reason, because of course there’s no guarantee that it would, and I don’t think it will. Actually, the Israelis don’t even consider the Abraham Accords in any discussions now around annexing the West Bank.

I think there were wider strategic considerations from the Emiratis’ perspective when it came to this question—same thing with the Bahrainis, and of course, the relationship both have with Washington, D.C., and how they saw geopolitical positioning in the region at the time. Of course, a lot of this has now changed, but I don’t see any inclination that they’re going to leave the accords.

The Moroccans aceded to the accords, frankly, because they wanted, in my opinion, American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara—and they got it. So, that worked well for them. Again, it wasn’t about Palestinians for them; it was purely about their own strategic interests as they saw it. Whether I agree with that or you agree with that is not the point.

Sudan did not normalize. It took a step toward normalization, but it did not normalize because that had to be subject to ratification from a new assembly or parliament of Sudan, which of course has never been established since. But for very understandable reasons, they took that step forward because they desperately needed to get Sudan off of the terrorism list from the United States in order for Sudan to recover. So I’m not surprised they felt they had to move in that direction. But it was only moving in that direction, not actually doing it, because I don’t think it would go down in Sudan. Quite frankly, I think Sudanese writ large would reject it. But they took that step in that direction, and it worked. It got them off the list.

If we’re talking about prior relationships with Arab states, then, of course, Jordan happened at a very different time, right after the Oslo Accords. Egypt was most concerned about getting Sinai back, although they included language in Camp David about Palestinians. But we know from history that never worked out.

So presumably that covers both the existing relations, and the newer ones since 2020. And, by the way, there have been other relations that just haven’t been very clear, and again for very different reasons. The Qataris had their own Israeli trade office in Doha in the early 2000s and it eventually closed. It closed because they didn’t think there was any utility to it, and they were angry about what was going on in the occupied territories.

Mauritania also normalized with the state of Israel. I don’t think anybody remembers this, because it didn’t last long. They broke off political ties within a few years because of their outrage at what the Israelis were doing in the occupied territories. The Omanis, of course, have had closer relations. But again, they all have their different reasons for this.

AF: So along with that, many have pointed to the issue of the Israel–Palestine conflict as a major source of persistent instability in the region. Do you think, in your lifetime, you’ll ever see a Palestinian state, and would its creation really bring peace to the Middle East?

Hellyer: So, the creation of a Palestinian state—I think you’ll have the overwhelming majority of states worldwide recognize one. 

Do I think it will be allowed to operate as such in my lifetime? I guess it depends how long I live.

I don’t see a political horizon for at least the next 10–20 years. You have to keep in mind there are two critical countries involved in how that situation is going to turn out. One, of course, is the United States. The other is Israel. They are the critical factors when it comes to actually allowing for a Palestinian state to be established: the U.S., by putting pressure on the Israelis or withdrawing support, and the Israelis by allowing one or not allowing one. Because there won’t be anybody else who will force the Israelis during the next 10–20 years.

I do think that the long-term trend is very bad for Israel when it comes to public opinion, not only in the U.S. but worldwide, including in Europe. I think that means they’ll have a much tougher time. Right now, they could rely on any Democratic president that has come to power so far, and any Republican president likely in the next decade. I think they can rely on a fair amount of support going forward, but I don’t think that’s indefinite.

Within the Democratic Party, there is a lot of angst about how the Israelis are perpetrating crimes in the occupied territories. Within the Republican Party, there’s a split between those who want to hold to Donald Trump’s perspective in this regard, and others who are far more “America First,” not wanting to provide arms and money to another state. As far as they’re concerned, Israel doesn’t necessarily impact their day-to-day lives. And then there are others who just don’t like the Israelis.

There will be new configurations in that regard, and I think that changes the calculus. But we’re not talking the immediate future, or the next 10 years or so. And one has to ask what’s going to be left for there to be established in terms of a state after that point.

I will say—just so your listeners don’t think this is unavoidable—there have been other times in history where Palestine, or different parts of it, were lost to Palestinians. 

I’m thinking particularly during the Crusader era, where crusaders established kingdoms. These kingdoms didn’t last. They lasted anything from 50 to 200 years 20 years. But eventually they disappeared. And they disappeared because they could only exist if, A), they really integrated into the region (and they didn’t, they refused) and B), if the surrounding community was just very, very weak and couldn’t withstand them (and of course, that eventually changed), and simultaneously if they had an external power backing them. And of course, eventually that external power also changes, right? I think history is has some interesting lessons for us to remember in this regard.

AF: That concludes our questions. Thank you very much for your time and for your thoughtful contributions, Dr. Hellyer.

Hellyer: My pleasure. Thank you.