Ending one of the bloodiest and most complex conflicts in modern history and installing peace is not a quick fix. It does not resemble a short sprint, but an exhausting marathon. Achieving it requires foresight, resilience, determination, and concessions. Two good starting points are the 2000 Clinton Parameters (on the creation of a Palestinian state over most of the West Bank and all of Gaza) and the 2003 Geneva Accords (on a comprehensive two-state solution), both of which lay out frameworks for addressing the core issues at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

It has been persuasively argued that a sustainable and just peace can only emerge under a unique alignment of conditions. Each condition is necessary; each is insufficient on its own. These include:

1. The rise of an Israeli leader genuinely committed to peace and willing to bear the political and strategic costs of achieving it.
2. A Palestinian leader with equivalent resolve, prepared to make difficult compromises.
3. Both leaders’ ability to persuade their societies of the urgency of peace, fostering public support, and cultivating a shared vision of coexistence.
4. A recognition by both that the moment is ripe for resolution and that delaying agreement harms their long-term national interests.

The absence of any one of these factors risks prolonging the conflict and deferring hope. Only when all conditions align can a genuine breakthrough occur, offering both people a horizon of reconciliation.

Demographic and International Considerations

French philosopher and mathematician Auguste Comte famously said, “Demography is destiny”. While not the sole determinant, demographics undeniably shape societies’ trajectories. Between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, Jews and Palestinians are today nearly equal in number. As of September 2025, Israel’s population was 10,148,000: 78.5% Jewish (7,758,000) and 21% Arab (2,130,000). In addition, 260,000 are citizens of foreign nationality. The State of Palestine’s 2025 population is estimated at 5.6 million.      

This conflict is about two national movements, Zionist and Palestinian. Their ideological, religious, and cultural differences are striking, and they both have deep historical claims to the same narrow strip of land. Their relationship is asymmetrical as Israel is the dominant party. Israel occupies the West Bank and is now in the process of reoccupying the Gaza Strip. Prolonged occupation harms not only Palestinians but also the State of Israel. The United Nations has passed dozens of resolutions declaring Israeli West Bank settlements illegal, calling for Palestinian self-determination, and reaffirming that land cannot be acquired by force.

UN Security Council Resolution 242 called for an end to the Israeli occupation of “territories” taken in the 1967 war. UN Resolution 338 demanded the establishment of a durable peace in the Middle East. Both provide a broad diplomatic framework. Other UN resolutions—including 252, 267, and 476 on Jerusalem, 465 on settlements, 607 and 608 on deportations, and 3236 on Palestinian sovereignty—reinforce the principle that Israeli expropriations and unilateral changes to Jerusalem’s status are invalid. Resolution 2334 reaffirmed that the borders of a future Palestinian state must be based on the 1967 lines and that settlements cannot dictate territorial outcomes. These resolutions highlight the international consensus: Palestinians have a right to self-determination and Israel carries obligations as an occupying power.

Gaza

Since Hamas seized Gaza in 2007, proposals to treat Gaza and the West Bank as a single entity have been unrealistic. The territories differ geographically, politically, and socially. Hamas and the PA are bitter rivals, with Hamas violently ousting Fatah (the PA’s majority political party) during its takeover. Unlike the PA, Hamas has never abandoned its commitment to Israel’s destruction and has consistently chosen violence over reconciliation.

As long as Hamas ruled Gaza, it was impossible to connect it safely to the West Bank through any tunnel or corridor. Doing so would have effectively created two separate Palestinian entities: a PA-led state in the West Bank and a Hamas-controlled ministate in Gaza. Yet, the West Bank and Gaza cannot simply be separated. Despite political rivalries, strong emotional, cultural, and family ties bind Palestinians in both regions. A final peace must include Gaza. If and when Gazans participate in the peace process, a secure corridor linking the territories should be created, with Palestinians responsible for ensuring it is not misused for violence, possibly with the help of other countries. Tranquility is a sine qua non for sustained coexistence.

The October 7, 2023, Hamas terror attack was a turning point. The unprecedented scale and brutality shocked Israeli society to its core and deeply traumatized its sense of security. Hamas created an ocean of hatred and animosity that is deep and irreconcilable, forcing Israel into massive retaliation and drawing the region into a devastating war. Hatred and revenge are terrible guides for any action, Palestinian or Israeli. By August 2025, more than 60,000 people were killed, including more than 17,000 children. Over 87,000 received critical care. Israel’s bombing campaign in this war is one of the most extensive in the history of warfare. 

Hamas set for Israel an ‘ethical trap’. Its initial attack was ethically obnoxious and was roundly condemned by the international community, yet it succeeded in provoking Israel into a counterattack that appears to know no ethical boundaries. It moved Israel from being seen by the international community as the victim of an unethical attack to being seen as the perpetrator of much worse ethical wrongs.  Evidence for this is in the number of people killed by either side. 

This tragedy underscores two lessons. First, Israel’s strategy of playing Hamas against the PA to weaken the latter has failed; divide-and-rule only entrenched extremism. Second, the root causes of the conflict cannot be ignored. At issue are two national movements, Jewish and Arab, that have justified claims over the same small piece of land. Both Arabs and Jews perceive that land as their national home. Israel should not reoccupy Gaza, and the vacuum left by Hamas must be filled by a governing body that is acceptable to the Palestinians and committed to the Oslo Accords.

A broad coalition—Israel, the United States, Arab states, the United Nations, and the wider international community—must establish a humanitarian framework to care for Gazans and begin reconstruction. With over 80% of the population displaced, infrastructure destroyed, and 42 million tons of rubble littering the territory, the scale of reconstruction is enormous. Clearing debris alone could take decades and cost $80 billion. Over half of the water and sanitation facilities have been destroyed. In the short term, there is a need to rebuild Gaza from the ashes and rehabilitate the lives of its people. This will require a complete overhaul of its physical infrastructure. The Palestinians are unable to do this on their own. Israel should not ignore its responsibility, and it is in its best interest, as well, to see that this is done. 

In February 2025, President Trump proposed relocating Gaza’s population to safer and more beautiful communities in the region, citing Egypt and Jordan as potential hosts. Crucially, the plan made no mention of consent—neither from the Gazan population nor from Egypt and Jordan as prospective recipients. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock condemned the idea as a violation of international law, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres denounced “any form of ethnic cleansing.”

If Trump is serious about executing his idea, rather than sweeping declarations, what’s needed is a phased, consensual approach grounded in humanitarian principles. Stage one should focus on family reunification: Egypt, Jordan, and the United States would agree on a capped number of voluntary immigrants with familial ties in host countries. Applications would follow standard immigration procedures, with careful vetting to exclude extremists who might destabilise host regimes. Temporary residency could be granted, with pathways to citizenship determined by each country.

After evaluating the first phase, a second round could be offered under similar terms. If Trump is committed, the United States must fund and coordinate the initiative in full partnership with Egypt and Jordan. Legitimacy hinges on consent—not coercion. A May 2025 survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 49% of Gazans may be willing to apply to leave, if supported by Israel.

Trump’s remarks sparked immediate debate. Indonesia offered to accept 1,000 refugees. In March, the Arab League convened in Cairo and countered with a $53 billion plan to rebuild Gaza by 2030 under a reformed Palestinian Authority. The proposal includes infrastructure development and a transition of power from Hamas to an interim administration of independents, with Egypt offering to train Palestinian police. While Hamas and the UN backed the plan, Israel rejected it, opposing any PA involvement.

Trump reiterated his vision of resettlement and reconstruction, while the White House emphasised openness to Arab input, claiming the proposal had catalysed regional engagement. The White House remarked: “While the President stands by his bold vision for a post-war Gaza, he welcomes input from our Arab partners in the region. It’s clear his proposals have driven the region to come to the table rather than allow this issue to devolve into further crisis.”

The West Bank

Resolving the conflict requires a cooperative framework in which Israel and the PA engage seriously with each other. Despite its flaws, the PA is still a preferable partner to more radical Palestinian factions. Strategically, preserving the PA is in Israel’s interest; its collapse would likely empower groups far less moderate and far more destabilising.

Over the years, Israel and the PA have managed pragmatic cooperation in areas such as security, health, and infrastructure, proving that functional engagement is possible and mutually beneficial. These mechanisms should be expanded. Israel should actively strengthen frameworks with Palestinian actors committed to non-violence and negotiation. Such cooperation contributes not only to stability but also to gradually rebuilding trust.

Israel and the PA need each other. Both remain committed to the Oslo Accords. The PA’s disintegration would be disastrous. It would remove the only semi-structured authority able to engage diplomatically and govern effectively, plunging the conflict back into volatility. To avoid this, constructive forces within both societies must break the recurring cycle of violence. Dialogue, mutual recognition, and non-violence must be the foundation.

An important step is promoting democratic processes in Palestinian politics, particularly free elections in the West Bank—limited to parties that recognise Israel, renounce violence, and respect democratic governance. Strengthening democratic accountability would empower moderates and create a legitimate negotiating partner. Similarly, Israel should reaffirm its commitment to democratic procedure and acknowledge Palestinian self-determination. Both sides must engage their own societies to ensure that reconciliation, once achieved, is durable and inclusive.

As long as the Gaza government remains hostile and terroristic, the border with Israel will remain sealed. If relationships improve and the government is willing to establish relations with Israel, the three parties—Gaza, Palestine and Israel—can work together to establish a tunnel connecting the West Bank and Gaza. 

Reconstruction

There is a need to rebuild Gaza and to install a new order. It is a delicate task to re-establish Gaza from the ashes. This is also in Israel’s interest and responsibility, which it should not ignore. It must be part of the solution, but it cannot do it on its own. It must have partners: the PA, the UN, Egypt, and other countries that have the goodwill and interest to re-establish Gaza. Rich countries that are said to have a dedicated interest in resolving the Palestinian problem, like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, with financial resources and experience, should play a leading role in Gaza’s recovery. Alternatively, if Trump’s “ownership” proposal over Gaza of February 2025 holds water, then the United States will have to clear tens of millions of tons of debris and make Gaza, as Trump suggested, into the ”Riviera of the Middle East”.

Israel has a responsibility, both moral and strategic, to ensure Gazans do not see militancy as their only future. Innovative proposals, such as building artificial islands off Gaza’s coast, could expand living space, support infrastructure, and create economic hubs. Artificial islands offer a viable means of territorial expansion, can alleviate overcrowding in Gaza’s densely populated urban centres, and support long-term socio-economic growth. They can facilitate urban planning by creating new space for housing, office complexes, and recreational facilities, while also serving as platforms for essential infrastructures. They can function as integrated transportation hubs, hosting airports, seaports, or nodes within larger systems of connectivity through bridges and tunnels. They would significantly enhance Gaza’s regional mobility and economic integration. Moreover, when designed with environmental considerations, artificial islands can help mitigate ecological degradation by diverting human activity away from sensitive terrestrial habitats. If implemented with sustainable planning and international oversight, artificial islands could serve as a model for innovative and ecologically responsible urban development in resource-constrained environments like Gaza. I develop these ideas further in my book Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Critical Study of Peace Negotiations, Mediation and, Facilitation between Israel and the PLO (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 

Israel rightly insists that Hamas should not be involved in the reconstruction of Gaza. Hamas does not show willingness to change its ideology and violent conduct and Israel cannot risk another major terror attack on its territory. Israel is wrong in rejecting the PA’s involvement. If the PA, with a new president, were to be proactive in fostering peace and clearly reject violence as a solution, then it should be involved in the Gaza reconstruction, together with the United States, the United Nations and other countries of goodwill that care about the future of Gaza. Israel should not reoccupy Gaza because it does not wish to care for more than 2 million Gazans. In 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to disengage from Gaza in order to reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians, enhance Israel’s security, and stabilise Israel’s political and economic landscape. As the toll—in blood and money—was too high for Israel, Sharon made a strategic decision that Israel could no longer support the Gaza Jewish settlements. The extreme elements in the current Israeli government who wish to make Gaza Jewish again should learn recent history. 

The Path Forward

Peace requires trust, goodwill, and security. But the path is long and fraught with setbacks. Public mistrust remains a major obstacle. In March 2024, 71% of Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank thought that the Hamas October 7 attack was correct. Sixty-four per cent of West Bankers and 59% of Gazans preferred to see Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip. Seventy-five per cent of West Bankers and 62% of the Gazans were satisfied with the performance of Hamas in the war. The majority of Palestinians perceived violence as the right course of action. As long as this is the case, ripeness for peace is questionable. 

The situation is in flux, however, because people reflect, contemplate, and may be undecided. This is manifested in a September 2024 poll in the West Bank and Gaza, where, for the first time since October 2023, findings show a significant drop in the favorability of the October 7 terror attack and expectations that Hamas will win the current war, and a moderate drop in the level of support for Hamas. In the Gaza Strip, findings also show a drop in preference for continued Hamas control over that area and a rise in preference for PA control. In May 2025, 48% of Palestinians in Gaza supported the anti-Hamas demonstrations in Gaza, compared to only 14% of Palestinians in the West Bank who supported those demonstrations. Findings also show a significant rise in support for the two-state solution, accompanied by a drop in preference for armed struggle, and an increase in preference for negotiations as the best means of ending the Israeli occupation. 

As for Israel, a poll conducted in March-April 2024 shows that only 26% of respondents believed a way can be found for Israel and a Palestinian state “to coexist peacefully”. Fifty percent said they did not believe it was possible at all, with 20 percent saying it depends on future developments. In January 2025, over 60% of the Jewish public agreed with the claim that Israel’s security needs necessitate both security and civilian control over Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The grieving and traumatized Israeli population is preoccupied with the fate of the 48 hostages that are still held by Hamas in Gaza, and by the prospects of more military casualties as the IDF is deepening its fighting into Gaza. Most Israelis have little concern for the suffering Gazans as they believe they brought the disastrous war on themselves by electing Hamas to power in 2006 and supporting its violent actions and terrorist conduct, including the October 7 brutal attack on Israel.

The road to peace is neither short nor straightforward. It requires:

• Zero tolerance of violence.
• Building trust and improving daily life for Palestinians.
• Stopping settlement expansion and evacuating isolated outposts.
• Dismantling unnecessary checkpoints in the West Bank to ease civilian hardship.
• Empowering Palestinian moderates through elections.
• Engaging the international community in reconstruction and trust-building.
• Addressing regional challenges, especially Iran, which remains hostile and committed to Israel’s destruction.

As of August 2025, both Israelis and Palestinians are battered and traumatized, but shifting attitudes suggest that opportunities may eventually emerge. We should not fall into the fallacy of thinking that the future is bound to be similar to the present situation, and whatever situation we are in is here to stay. Peace will not come quickly, but its potential rewards—security, prosperity, and justice for both peoples—justify the immense effort required.