Some commentators have argued that the war with Iran is another front in the strategic contest between the United States and China. According to this view, Washington’s decision to attack Iran is also an attempt at weakening one of Beijing’s key energy partners and limiting China’s influence in the Middle East.

While great-power competition increasingly shapes global geopolitics, including in the Middle East, this interpretation exaggerates China’s role in the current conflict. The most immediate implications of the war for China lie in the energy domain as it raises concerns about the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil trade normally flows. Washington has urged major energy importers, including China, to contribute to efforts to secure shipping through the strait. 

Despite these energy implications, the war with Iran is not primarily about China. Instead, it is rooted in the long-standing confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel, particularly regarding concerns over Tehran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and regional activities. For the United States and Israel, there is also a sense that shifting regional conditions have created an opportunity to act.

Still, even if China isn’t driving events, the crisis could influence Beijing’s regional strategy and the broader dynamics of U.S.-China competition in ways not fully appreciated in Washington. Much of the argument linking the war to China rests on an overstated view of the China-Iran relationship, assuming Beijing and Tehran operate as allies and that Iran sits at the center of China’s Middle East strategy. Both assumptions are misleading.

In reality, the relationship has been more pragmatic than strategic. Iran has been an important supplier of energy to China and a useful trade partner during periods of Western sanctions. Part of Iran’s strategic attractiveness to Beijing lies in its ability to serve as a geopolitical insurance card, one that the United States cannot easily influence, in a region otherwise long dominated by American power. 

However, Tehran does not occupy the central position in China’s Middle East strategy that many observers assume. In recent years, as Western sanctions on Iran crippled its economy, and as China’s relationships with countries in the region (such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE) grew stronger, Beijing increasingly viewed Iran as weak, gradually reducing its economic engagement in areas such as infrastructure and investment and its strategic reliance on Iran in the energy sector.

China’s Strategic Adjustments in the Middle East      

Over the past decade, Beijing has steadily expanded its engagement with Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These relationships offer deeper economic opportunities, greater political stability, and expanding cooperation to include not only traditional energy exports but also infrastructure, logistics, technology, and the energy transition. Within this broader framework, Iran represents only one (increasingly limited) element of China’s regional portfolio rather than its strategic anchor.

China’s recalibration of its approach in the Middle East in response to regional dynamics has been increasingly evident in recent years. As mentioned above, Beijing has been focusing on developing stronger partnerships with countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia while de-prioritizing its relationship with Tehran, which China views as increasingly weak and unreliable. 

Another telling example is China’s evolving dynamic with Israel. Following the October 7 attacks and the Gaza war that followed, China adopted a more critical approach toward Israel. Beijing’s calculation appeared straightforward: the benefits of criticizing the United States and improving its regional positioning outweighed the potential damage to the bilateral relationship with Israel.

Beijing appears to have reassessed its position as Israel demonstrated increasing effectiveness in its regional military operations, first against Hezbollah in Lebanon and then following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. It has become more aware of Israel’s growing military strength and its role in the shifting regional balance of power. In response, China has begun signaling renewed interest in a more productive relationship with Israel after several years of stagnation.

China’s response to the war with Iran reflects a similar dynamic of adjusting to an evolving reality. Beijing has relied on relatively mild diplomatic messaging while avoiding direct involvement in the conflict. The dispatch of China’s special envoy for the Middle East, Zhai Jun, on a regional mediation mission illustrates this pattern. Such moves allow China to signal political engagement while avoiding the risks and responsibilities that come with an active regional conflict.

Once the fighting subsides, Beijing may attempt to revive the Saudi-Iran rapprochement it helped facilitate in 2023. Whether such an effort succeeds will depend on the regional landscape that emerges after the war. Either way, the approach reflects China’s preferred role in the region: pursuing economic cooperation, filling vacuums, and supporting diplomatic dialogue while remaining outside the Middle East’s security architecture.

Any prolonged disruption would affect China, the world’s largest energy importer. This would be of concern in Beijing, and reports have surfaced of an agreement between Chinese and Iranian officials regarding the treatment of Chinese shipping should tensions in the Strait escalate.

Yet, China may still be better positioned than many U.S. allies to absorb short-term shocks. Beijing maintains substantial strategic petroleum reserves and has diversified supply networks through Russia, Central Asia, and Africa. By contrast, several American partners in Asia remain far more exposed to disruptions in Gulf energy flows. Japan, for example, imports roughly 95% of its crude oil from the Middle East, leaving it particularly vulnerable to regional instability. Yet, the current war presents China not only with risks but also with opportunities. 

Opportunities for Leverage Against the United States     

Since Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency, Beijing has largely adopted a wait-and-see approach toward developments in the Middle East. Rather than launching new initiatives, China has focused on diplomatic messaging while monitoring how U.S. policy evolves. This reflects both caution and recognition that the United States under Trump remains the dominant military actor in the region. While China has kept a low profile during the conflict itself, it will likely begin to pursue strategic gains once the immediate crisis subsides.

Another important dimension of the conflict is its effect on the distribution of American strategic attention. For several years, U.S. policymakers have sought to pivot their focus toward the Indo-Pacific and the challenge posed by China, particularly Beijing’s growing military capabilities and its increasingly assertive posture around Taiwan. The Taiwan Strait has become a central flashpoint, where the risk of escalation between the United States and China is closely tied to questions of deterrence, military balance and political signalling.  A prolonged military engagement in the Middle East would complicate that effort.

From Beijing’s perspective, this dynamic isn’t unwelcome. If Washington again finds itself absorbed in Middle Eastern crises, pressure on China in Asia could ease, particularly in sensitive theatres such as the Taiwan Strait.     

Beyond Taiwan, Beijing still has an interest in maintaining some level of cooperation with Washington, both to preserve economic stability and to keep competition from escalating. Watching developments in the Middle East under a president clearly drawn to the projection of American power, Beijing’s instinct will likely be to work to secure a period of relative stability in its relationship with Washington. China is still keen to proceed with President Trump’s planned visit to Beijing despite the administration’s request to delay the meeting by another month. The meeting would offer an opportunity for both sides to address the regional implications of the war and the broader trajectory of U.S.-China relations.

The crisis has also given China several potential levers in its negotiations with the United States. It remains the largest buyer of Iranian oil, much of it purchased through indirect channels despite U.S. sanctions. President Trump’s call for help in securing the Strait of Hormuz might also give Beijing a degree of bargaining space in conversations with Washington. 

In practical terms, Beijing could signal a willingness to reduce purchases of Iranian oil or shift some imports toward other suppliers, including the United States, in exchange for concessions. These could include greater flexibility in sanctions enforcement, a more stable framework for energy trade, or progress on broader economic issues between the two powers. China could also offer to play a role in monitoring or supporting elements of any future U.S.–Iran understanding related to the security of the Strait, positioning itself as a useful, if limited, contributor to regional stability.

Beijing will calibrate its Middle East policy on several fronts, including: using regional issues as leverage, or, when useful, as a means for easing tension in dealings with Washington; continuing to criticise U.S. actions rhetorically while presenting itself as an alternative strategic partner; and preparing to capitalise on economic opportunities once the fighting subsides.

Chinese officials are likely to use the crisis to reinforce a narrative aimed at U.S. partners in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf. Beijing has long argued that close security partnerships with Washington haven’t delivered stability and have increasingly exposed regional states to economic and strategic risks. The current attacks on U.S. allies in the region and disruptions to energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz give China additional space to advance that message.