Donald Trump’s first term featured headline-grabbing moves: the Abraham Accords, the “Deal of the Century”, recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and U.S. support for Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. His efforts nearly culminated in a landmark Saudi-Israeli normalization deal.

Trump continues to envision a grand regional order centred on the containment of Iran, economic integration, and strategic realignment. This desire to transform the region into a network of U.S.-aligned peace and prosperity initiatives persists through his second term. Yet, this vision is not pursued through conventional diplomacy but rather a sharp-edged, deal-oriented style that disrupts traditional alliances and applies transactional pressure on both allies and adversaries. 

Moreover, the regional landscape in 2025 is more complex than during Trump’s first term. The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel triggered one of the most brutal escalations in the conflict’s history, and a devastating war in Gaza, whose destabilising effects have rippled far beyond the region. Simultaneously, global powers such as China, Russia, and India have expanded their regional presence through infrastructure projects, trade relations, and military partnerships.     

While Trump’s approach has secured tactical wins, such as deepened Gulf partnerships and a revived pressure campaign on Iran, it has also exposed structural vulnerabilities in U.S. strategy. Traditional alliances, particularly with Israel, are under strain, as Gulf states increasingly take the lead in shaping regional outcomes.  In mid-June, Israel launched a direct strike on Iran, triggering escalating attacks and testing the U.S.’s stance of favouring negotiation over confrontation.

The Trump administration’s economic pivot, exemplified by the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), offers a potential strategic framework, but its success depends on sustained U.S. commitment and regional buy-in.

As the strategic environment shifts, regional actors are increasingly hedging, diversifying their alliances, and asserting greater autonomy. The Middle East is no longer a unipolar arena but a contested space where global and regional powers compete and cooperate simultaneously.

The Architecture of Trump’s Middle East Approach

The Trump administration’s early moves reflect an emphasis on restoring American leverage through economic and diplomatic deals—though often without mechanisms to ensure long-term stability. Trump projects strength through military, economic, and rhetorical tools, using unpredictability as a strategic asset. His disruption of traditional alliances signals a deliberate departure from diplomatic norms, treating even longstanding partnerships as negotiable. In the Middle East, this reflects a unilateral rather than an isolationist approach—Trump seeks the ability to act freely in what he sees as pursuing American interests, but without constraints from the old binding alliances. 

This tension between Trump’s tactical approach and his aspirational vision defines both the opportunity and risk of his second-term Middle East policy. His ambitions are substantial: a region realigned through peace deals, unified in opposition to a nuclear Iran, and interconnected through U.S.-led economic platforms. These goals appeal to regional leaders seeking stability, investment and conflict mitigation. Paradoxically, Trump’s predictably transactional style offers a form of transparency—regional actors understand his motivations and methods, and see opportunities to benefit. However, the volatility of his approach raises questions about long-term U.S. reliability and has widened an already significant trust gap. China, in particular, seeks to exploit this by positioning itself as a more stable, long-term partner, not only in infrastructure but increasingly in the technology and defence domains as well.

U.S.-Israel Relations in Trump’s Second Term: Strategic Alignment and Its Limits 

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu placed a strategic bet on Trump’s return, expecting it to strengthen Israel’s position and provide greater operational freedom, particularly on Iran and Gaza. That bet has yielded some short-term benefits, including restored military aid and diplomatic cover, but the dynamics have proven more complex than anticipated. 

In fact, Trump’s pursuit of American interests and broader regional deals—sometimes at Israel’s expense—has highlighted the limits of traditional ties, even under a U.S. administration viewed as ideologically aligned with Israel. 

While the Trump administration’s swift reinstatement of its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran was welcomed by Israel, the U.S decision to resume nuclear negotiations with Tehran in April 2025 caught Israel off guard. From Israel’s perspective, these negotiations represented a dangerous strategic miscalculation, as Israeli officials feared the negotiations would culminate in an agreement that allows Iran to retain significant nuclear infrastructure, falling short of the “Libya model”, a complete dismantlement of nuclear capabilities, which Israel deems essential for regional security.

These anxieties were compounded when the United States abruptly halted its military campaign against the Houthis, just two days after a ballistic missile struck Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. The timing reinforced Israeli concerns that its security is no longer central to U.S. strategic calculations, even under Trump. In both the Iranian and Houthi contexts, Prime Minister Netanyahu faced a difficult choice: whether Israel should act unilaterally, even at the risk of defying Trump’s preference for regional stability.

The growing alignment of the United States with Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which continue to advocate for negotiation over confrontation, was put to the test in mid-June. Citing Iran’s failure to meet a 60-day deadline set by President Trump, Israel launched a direct strike on Iranian targets, triggering a cascade of tit-for-tat attacks between the two countries.

Israel’s strategy, which appeared aimed at convincing the United States to enter the conflict, paid off when President Trump ordered an unprecedented strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. After several days of mutual threats and a largely symbolic Iranian response targeting a U.S. base in Qatar, Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran and declared that his focus would now shift toward pursuing regional peace.

However, rather than a seamless U.S.–Israel alignment, recent events have exposed a more complex—and at times tense—dynamic. It was only after Israel demonstrated both resolve and operational superiority that the United States joined the campaign. For Trump, the strikes were as much about setting the stage for a swift resolution and returning to his broader regional vision as they were about backing an ally. When the ceasefire began to unravel just hours later, a visibly frustrated Trump directed his anger at Israel, concerned that the setback could jeopardize his wider regional agenda.

This layered dynamic in the U.S.-Israel relationship has been apparent in other areas such as Syria, where the United States lifted sanctions and met with President al-Shara without consulting Israel. The move signaled a growing U.S. willingness to bypass Israeli concerns in pursuit of broader regional deals. It also underscored Israel’s declining gatekeeper role, as Arab leaders now prefer working through Gulf intermediaries, especially Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS). This shift extends to arms and nuclear deals, once tied to normalization with Israel, now offered to Gulf states independently, undermining Israeli leverage.

Last, but not least, the administration’s engagement with Hamas to free American hostages, including American-Israeli citizen Edan Alexander, exposed tactical divergences with Israel. Alexander’s release was a diplomatic win for Trump, achieved through direct negotiations with Hamas intermediaries. While aligned with humanitarian objectives, the move bypassed Israeli channels and signalled Trump’s willingness to engage pragmatically even with actors considered untouchable by Israel. This dual-track approach—giving Israel a free hand for its campaign in Gaza while engaging its adversaries—created unease and underscored the degree to which Trump prioritises American interests above alliance sensitivities.

American pressure on Israel has since grown. Throughout May 2025, the Trump administration has intensified its calls for Israel to scale back its military campaign in Gaza. While still broadly supportive, senior U.S. officials have warned that extended operations risk undermining regional stability and endangering U.S. diplomatic initiatives, particularly with other important U.S. allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Israel’s declared intention to maintain a prolonged military presence in Gaza and encourage “voluntary migration” partially aligns with Trump’s controversial “Riviera of the Middle East” vision, which includes population relocation schemes. Egypt has attempted to build Arab unity around an alternative course, proposing a $53 billion reconstruction plan for Gaza that empowers a technocratic Palestinian administration. It also signalled its growing discontent with the U.S. administration by hosting a high-profile joint air force exercise with China in April. 

During President Trump’s visit to the region in May 2025, Gulf leaders, despite his stated preference, reasserted the Arab Peace Initiative, rather than the Abraham Accords, as the most viable path to resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and advancing regional integration. Israel, for its part, succeeded in bringing the United States into the conflict with Iran. Looking ahead, while Trump is clearly intent on leaving a lasting imprint on the region, with an end to the war in Gaza positioned as a key priority, it remains to be seen which regional powers will most decisively shape the direction and outcome of his vision.

Power, Profit, and the Gulf: Trump’s Economic Playbook in the Middle East 

Trump’s second-term foreign policy has leaned heavily on economic instruments, replacing traditional diplomacy with economic leverage and transactional deal-making. This is most evident in his growing ties with the Gulf. His first overseas visit of his second term to the Middle East marked a strategic pivot, portraying the Gulf not as a burden but as a platform for innovation, capital, and geopolitical influence. 

Unlike in 2017, a stop in Jerusalem was not included. The optics of the ongoing war in Gaza offered Trump little political upside domestically, while Gulf capitals promised immediate returns, both diplomatically and financially.

Trump’s delegation included tech and investment leaders such as Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, and Larry Fink, who joined the “Saudi–US Investment Forum” to advance cooperation in AI, defence, energy and biotech. The U.S. Treasury also announced a fast-track investment screening mechanism, streamlining regulatory approvals for trusted Gulf partners. The UAE has pledged over $1.4 trillion in investment across technology and infrastructure; Saudi Arabia committed $600 billion in line with its Vision 2030 strategy. In return, the U.S. has indicated a willingness to relax certain export controls, particularly on high-end semiconductors and support joint ventures in strategic sectors.

These initiatives aim to reinforce U.S. influence and counter China’s deepening regional role, particularly in infrastructure and technology, by advancing strategic defence and digital partnerships. For Trump, they also serve a domestic purpose: stimulating the U.S. economy amid inflationary pressures and strained transatlantic relations.

More broadly, Trump has come to recognise the Middle East not merely as a zone of instability, but as a region of untapped economic and strategic opportunity, one that he can capitalise on. This marks a sharp departure from the post-9/11 paradigm that framed the region primarily through the lenses of terrorism, insurgency, and security threats. The administration now portrays the Gulf as a platform for global capital flows, advanced energy transition, and technological development. In official rhetoric, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are no longer just security clients, but business partners in shaping the contours of a desired economic order.

Amid this shift, Israel finds itself at a strategic crossroads. Historically, Israel’s regional standing has been built on military strength, cutting-edge technology, and close intelligence ties, especially with the United States. However, the evolving U.S. approach, alongside the rising economic ambitions of Gulf states, reflects a broader realignment in which economic cooperation and pragmatic partnerships are taking precedence over traditional security alliances. 

This complicates Israel’s position, as its core security concerns do not always align with the economically driven agendas now shaping regional diplomacy. While Israel has emerged from the past 18 months of war as a regional military superpower, its non-military appeal has diminished. The changing dynamic suggests that Israel’s influence will depend increasingly on how it navigates the intersection of economic engagement and security imperatives.

The Regional Architecture in Flux: Abraham Accords and Beyond

The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, initially promised Israel a mechanism to effectively navigate this evolving balance—offering a dual path of regional economic integration and a shared security framework, especially in deterring Iran. The agreements not only enabled normalization between Israel and several Arab states but also parallel deals with the U.S., ranging from arms sales to economic cooperation, which created a triangular architecture of mutual benefit. For Israel, the Accords combined strategic legitimacy with access to new markets. For Arab states, they offered both access to Israeli technology and tangible incentives from Washington. The arrangement was positioned as a rare win-win-win: strategic deterrence, economic modernization, and a reconfiguration of regional reliance on Washington.

Trump sees the expansion of the Abraham Accords—specifically Israeli-Saudi normalization—as the centerpiece of his second-term Middle East policy—the ultimate deal that could deliver both strategic legacy and personal acclaim, including what he reportedly sees as his most viable path to the Nobel Peace Prize. During his first term, Trump focused his efforts on states with limited involvement in the Palestinian issue. Today, his attention is squarely on Saudi Arabia, the symbolic and geopolitical heavyweight of the Arab world. Normalization with Israel is framed primarily as part of a wider U.S.–Saudi economic deal, aimed at countering China and, possibly, shaping a new regional framework that could even include Lebanon or Syria.

Yet, in the wake of the Gaza war, the political environment has changed. Normalization now carries significant political costs for Arab leaders, particularly as public outrage over Gaza intensifies. While American officials, including the president, have consistently argued that a normalization agreement was close, Trump’s May 2025 statement to MBS “to do it in your own time, and that’s what I want, and that’s what you want, and that’s the way it’s going to be” sounds like an acknowledgement of this shift. While normalization remains part of the U.S. regional agenda and is still on the table, Saudi Arabia will be demanding a price from both the United States and Israel for any substantial progress, including on the Palestinian front. Although direct contact between Israel and Saudi Arabia continues, Israeli officials would be wise to take the shift in the Saudi and regional approach at face value rather than as lip service to the Palestinian cause.

This also affects another crucial geoeconomic instrument: The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which Trump reaffirmed following his February 2025 meeting with Indian Prime Minister Modi. Originally launched under President Biden at the G20 Summit in Delhi in September 2023, IMEC was conceived as a strategic platform to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It reflects Trump’s strategy of leveraging economic instruments for geopolitical influence—embedding American companies, standards, and norms within strategic sectors across allied regions, thereby supporting long-term U.S. economic interests. Crucially, however, IMEC transcends Trump’s often transactional, bilateral approach. 

At its core, IMEC is a vehicle for creating interdependence among countries that are allies and have increasingly become central to U.S. geopolitical interests: it offers India a platform to deepen its connectivity with the West; it allows Gulf states to diversify their economic ties beyond oil; and it gives Israel an expanded geoeconomic role in the region and beyond. This interconnectedness creates the potential for a more cohesive bloc capable of counterbalancing China, not only in logistics but also in advanced sectors like AI and high technology, areas where the United States seeks to hold competitive advantages. While the United States has a critical role to play in launching IMEC, it is up to the countries of the region to take the lead in shaping it to suit their regional agendas.  

The past two years have shown, however, that the expansion of the Abraham Accords and IMEC’s strategic promise are not automatic. Both hinge on sustained U.S. engagement, the trajectory of regional conflicts, and the ability of regional powers to formulate a shared vision. The roles that Israel and Egypt ultimately play will be decisive, as will how these initiatives integrate Palestinians into the regional framework. Current developments risk leaving Israel isolated from these emerging economic networks, potentially undermining the broader strategic vision.

While the ceasefire between Israel and Iran appears to be holding for now, the stakes for the United States remain high. A renewed push for the Abraham Accords and IMEC remains America’s most effective tools for stabilizing the region while reshaping its role from military guarantor to economic architect. Fail to engage, and China will exploit every gap with its centralized, state-backed alternatives to strengthen its regional position at Washington’s expense.

Tactical Wins, Structural Vulnerabilities

Trump’s second term, marked by the absence of a cohesive strategic framework, has yielded a mix of tactical gains and dramatic shifts: renewed economic partnerships, a partial restoration of American influence in the region, but also a war between Israel and Iran whose long-term consequence, despite substantial setbacks for Iran, have yet to unfold.  While a new nuclear agreement with Iran, the Abraham Accords and initiatives like IMEC offer potential anchors for U.S. policy, real, lasting progress will depend on clearer U.S. engagement and sustained strategic commitment. 

Despite regional shifts, the Abraham Accords and IMEC continue to represent America’s most promising tools for long-term regional influence, not through military dominance, but through economic integration and diplomatic innovation. Yet both initiatives now face critical tests. The Accords risk stagnation without addressing Palestinian grievances, while IMEC’s connectivity vision relies on regional political will and a joint effort to overcome political, regulatory and other challenges. Success requires the United States to move beyond short-term transactional deal-making toward building durable frameworks that can outlast regional crises.

Regional actors are hedging more aggressively, expanding ties with China, Russia, and Europe. China now surpasses the United States in trade with many Middle Eastern countries, while Russia remains deeply entrenched in Syria and Iran. These actors are not simply filling a vacuum; they are shaping the regional order.

Trump’s evolving Middle East strategy, part visionary, part opportunist, will shape not only his legacy but also the region’s future alignment. The question of who is truly shaping the region remains open. Trump will likely continue to dominate the headlines, but it is regional players who are quietly reshaping the regional order, often by working through him.

This essay was updated on June 30, 2025