Israel’s claims of ‘self-defence’ to justify the mass killing of Palestinians and other repressive practices of occupation and annexation have lost global support over the course of its military campaigns in Gaza. In response, and to boost its nation-building narrative, Israel has gradually resorted to broader claims to garner support. 

The ultra-nationalist/religious political forces that make up the current Israeli government, for example, are increasingly positioning themselves as defenders of Western civilization, casting Islam as being incorrigibly violent or even evil, and branding critics as antisemites. Although this is not an entirely new phenomenon, anti-Islam rhetoric is fast becoming central to the charm offensives and political partnerships of the Israeli government with European semi-fascist parties, such as Vox (Spain), the Swedish Democrats, and the Rassemblement Nationale (France).

At the same time, semi-fascist parties—such as the AfD in Germany and the FPÖ in Austria—have gained political influence and power across Europe. These groups often echo such broader Israeli claims because they align with their own views on social inclusion and exclusion, help securitize popular views of ‘the other’ (i.e. Muslims), whitewash their often antisemitic pasts, and show how a more homogenous society can be created by a mix of legislation and radical violence. 

In the short-term, the impact of European semi-fascist parties using Israeli narratives prolongs the suffering of the Palestinian people and creates new risks for Israel. But their use of Israeli narratives that justify exclusion and repression also provides a stark warning of what may happen once European semi-fascist parties are in power. 

The Double Agenda of Israel’s Extremists

Israel’s political landscape is gripped by a mix of ultra-nationalist/religious fervour that produces external atrocities and domestic political strife. On the one hand, its ultra-nationalist and religious policies reject recognition of the Palestinians as a people outright and instead paint them as ‘the other’ who needs to be made to submit, ‘tamed’, and, if necessary, killed. The destruction of Gaza and continuous settler rampages in the West Bank show this mindset in action. 

On the other hand, the same ultra-nationalist and religious political forces are at work domestically to turn Israel into a more authoritarian state in which countervailing institutional powers to the executive are eliminated. Their targets include(d) the Supreme Court, the Advocate General, the head of the Shin Bet, the Chief of Staff of the army, and the military advocate general. Once accomplished, it will prove to be a short(er) step to imposing the tenets of ultra-nationalism and -religiosity by branding political dissenters as traitors and secularists as heretics.

These ultra-nationalist and-religious political forces, currently led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, include political parties such as Likud (with individuals like Defense Minister Israel Katz and Diaspora Minister Amichai Chikli), Jewish Power (led by far-right Israeli politician Itamar Ben Gvir), New Right (led by former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and former Minister of the Interior Ayelet Shaked), and Religious Zionism (led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich); settler movements like Gush Emunim, Nachala, and the Yesha Council; as well as parts of the Israeli administration, police force, and army. Nationalist and religious convictions run strong in the military’s Kfir brigade, for example, with its history of brutal violence against Palestinians. The same is true of the Netzah Yehuda unit that is staffed by Haredi (ultra-orthodox) volunteers, and the Desert Frontier platoons, which are manned by Hilltop Youth, an extremist settler militia. 

It is important to note that these forces are not homogenous and that each has its own origins and objectives. They share a desire to maintain occupation, but do not necessarily see eye to eye on its end state. For example, Ben Gvir is a latter-day disciple of ultra-nationalist politician Meir Kahane who was mostly concerned about the homogeneity and purity of the inhabitants of Israel within the 1967 borders. Likud came to power in 1977 under Menachim Begin by virtue of the votes of marginalized Jewish migrants that had been relegated to the country’s poorer peripheries. And Bezalel Smotrich is a violent revisionist who believes in Israel’s right to annex and, if necessary, empty the occupied territories of its Palestinian inhabitants by coercive means.  

The horrors of October 7, 2023 and the self-reliant, introverted siege mentality of much of Israeli society have so far prevented acknowledgement of the fact that its disparate and often factitious ultra-nationalist and religious political forces have enabled a military campaign with genocidal effects in Gaza. The brutal military decimation of Gaza has, however, already destroyed the country’s moral standing across the globe, traumatized thousands of its own soldiers, and is likely to haunt future generations of Israelis. 

The ‘Self-Defense’ Approach Falters

With waning support for its occupation around the world, Israel’s political elites have repositioned themselves as the vanguard of protecting Western civilization by any means, including as many breaches of international law as necessary. They are dusting off an old narrative and turning it into a new global influencing strategy that portrays Israel as forming a bulwark of the ‘West’ against terrorism and Islam. 

Former general and Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak compared his country to “a villa in the jungle” in 1996. On October 5, 2025, Netahyahu reiterated that claim when he said, “We are fighting the battle of the free world, to prevent barbarians from storming Europe”. Israeli minister Chikli also used this frame on October 17, 2025 in the Times of India: “This is a global war against a super radical and super sophisticated ideology…its end goal is to make sure Islam is dominant and people submit to Sharia law, losing their liberties, losing their way of life”. 

As part of this resurgent narrative of “Israel against Islam on behalf of the West”, critics of Israeli policies are increasingly countered with fever-pitch accusations of antisemitism along the lines of the IHRA definition which, unlike the much more precise Jerusalem Declaration, has been purposefully instrumentalized to equate anti-Zionism with antisemitism. In addition to creating a conceptual fallacy, this disregards strong anti-Zionist stances from the likes of Jewish thinkers like Hannah Arendt, Martin Buber, and Yeshayahu Leibowitz.      

European Semi-fascists Ride to the Rescue?

Israel has found enthusiastic support for its anti-Islamic “savior of Western civilization” framework among the leaders of European parties that incorporate elements of fascism. 

According to existing academic literature, fascism can be described as a political ideology that calls for a strong leader while demanding loyalty to that leader as well as the nation. Fascism is also ultra-nationalistic and xenophobic in nature in the sense of wanting to restore a patriotic and ‘pure’ population (a.k.a. nativism). As a result, it rejects social and political pluralism and seeks to establish party (or coalition) dominance over the state—in particular, the so-called ‘deep state’, which is viewed as undermining the ‘will of the people’ that fascist parties presumably represent. Finally, fascist parties have tended towards a state-controlled economy (this point has become less relevant in the 21^st century), and a willingness to resort to authoritarian means to achieve objectives. 

It is useful to note that alternative labels for (semi-)fascism exist, such as ‘(populist) far-right’ or ‘hard-right’. Yet they can be confusing because several such parties combine more left-wing policies favouring their ‘in-group’ with strict right-wing measures against what they define as the ‘out-group’. 

Several European parties meet one, two or more of the criteria listed above and can be analytically treated as ‘semi-fascist’. The list includes, but is not limited to, the PVV and FVD (Netherlands), AfD (Germany), Rassemblement Nationale (France), Vox (Spain), FPÖ (Austria), Danish People’s Party (Denmark), Vlaams Belang (Belgium) and Fidesz (Hungary). As with the Israeli political scene, it should be kept in mind that these parties have different origins and objectives, including in relation to the Israeli state. But they share (at least some) ideological tenets of fascism, just as Israel’s ultra-nationalist/religious political actors have commonalities regarding occupation. 

A good example of a European semi-fascist politician echoing an Israeli claim that seeks to justify the latter’s violence and occupation is Geert Wilders of the Dutch PVV. In June 2025, he suggested that “If Jerusalem falls, Athens, Paris or Amsterdam are next”. In January 2026, he remarked that “We must unconditionally support Israel in battle”, referring to Gaza. Together, these statements amount to a validation of Israel’s military campaigns to continue its occupation. 

Israeli right-wing politicians appear to be capitalizing on this semi-fascist support. For example, Santiago Abascal (the leader of Vox, Spain) met with diaspora minister Chikli and agriculture minister Avi Dichter in late 2023 to strengthen ties with Likud and discuss ‘stopping radical Islam’  and defending ‘European values’. “It [Israel] faces the hatred of Islamic fundamentalism, which also hates the West and is penetrating European societies. What happened in Israel could happen to us in the future,” Abascal said.

It was in the same vein that Minister Chikli invited Tommy Robinson (a British right-wing extremist) to visit Israel in October 2025 to build stronger bridges of solidarity, fight terrorism, and ‘defend Western civilization’. 

Jordan Bardella of the Rassemblement Nationale (France) echoed such views by painting Israel’s offensive in Gaza as a war of “civilization against barbarism” during a visit to Israel in March 2025 (he added it should be conducted in line with international law). On March 27, 2025 at an antisemitism conference in Jerusalem, Bardella said that “Islamism is the totalitarianism of the 21st century. It threatens to destroy everything that is not like it”. 

There is also deeper similarity between Israeli “civilizational narratives” of Jewish primacy—and hence the ‘justified necessity’ of displacing Palestinians—and the aversion that European semi-fascist parties show to refugees. Both share the common trait of framing Islam as a threat. 

For example, Alexander Gauland of the AfD had already commented in October 2017 that “refugees were endangering the German way of life” while noting that “We don’t like Islamic invasion”, and promised to “take his country back from refugees”. On November 25, 2023, senior figures of his party—such as Roland Hartwig and Ulrich Siegmund—faced backlash after  discussing plans for mass deportations from Germany at the Adlon Mansion in Potsdam with a few CDU members and Martin Sellner, a well-known Austrian right-wing extremist. 

The tragic irony is that some European semi-fascist parties also have antisemitic legacies, or even current viewpoints, which today tends to be airbrushed away for the sake of convenience. Consider for example Fidesz, the Rassemblement Nationale, the FPÖ, and the AFD that all have rich seams of antisemitism in their past. An individual like Tommy Robinson, for example, used to be a member of the antisemitic British National Party. One might then reasonably expect Israeli politicians of all stripes to avoid such parties and individuals. Instead, many of Europe’s semi-fascist political parties are on good terms with the Israeli government, and the Likud party in particular. It is hence useful to explore why and how Israeli ethno-nationalism inspires and obtains support from European semi-fascists.

Motives and Opportunism

Broadly speaking, Israeli narratives which justify the occupation of Palestinian lands have three functions that are useful to European semi-fascist political parties. To begin with, they are a source of inspiration in the sense that some European political parties admire Israel for being unapologetic about the superiority and dominance of its Jewish identity to the exclusion of groups like the Palestinians, Druze, and Arabs; its ruthlessness in securing the privileges and rights of the Jewish in-group; and its expansion of territorial control by claiming ownership over the entire mandate area of Palestine, subjugating or expelling ‘the other’ in the process. Geert Wilders articulated this succinctly in 2018 when he stated that “The more Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria, the better, for that land is Jewish—and Jordan is Palestine”. 

It must be noted that the power of inspiration is not necessarily based on either Israel or Jewish identity. This becomes apparent in the simultaneous existence of antisemitic and pro-Israel strands in parties like the AFD and FPÖ. Ultimately, it is the functional precedent that inspires. In other words, Israel is a relatable case study of how ethnic-nationalist supremacy can be realized through an extended powerplay of ‘might makes right’. Israel sits closer to European imagination and identity than other places where similar dynamics of repression and/or forced displacement are at work, like India (Kashmir), Turkey (the Kurds), Myanmar (Rohingya), or Sudan (Darfur).

Another function of Israeli narratives for European semi-fascist parties is that they offer a practical—albeit extreme—example of how one can design and apply tools to realize ethno-religious homogeneity. These include legal frameworks that institutionalize apartheid (such as Israel’s nation-state law and discriminatory legislation); revocation of residency permits, forced displacement and forced expulsion, politicized courts and police forces to enforce such frameworks; and the use of radicalized youth wings as paramilitary vanguards (such as the hilltop youth as part of broader settler movements). 

Even though the context differs substantially and Israel represents an extreme case, one can see the conceptual echoes of Israeli practices in Europe, such as those mentioned in the manifestos or proposals of some semi-fascist parties to revoke citizenship under particular conditions; criminalize peaceful protest; expedite the expulsion of refugees without due process if they violate the law; launch smear campaigns against the legal system (or initiatives to co-opt it) as well as against left-wing opposition parties. Citizen border controls against refugees offer another example, notably those that are dark-skinned or Muslim (e.g. in Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands).

Finally, by framing Israel as valiantly fighting against the tides of a violent and radical Islam that is bent on the destruction of both Israel and the West, Europe’s semi-fascists can establish the notion that some threats must be countered by any means necessary, including violence. This is a useful image and response mechanism to amplify given their own conviction that Western civilization is under threat. Moreover, this framing makes the fight against Islam existential in nature, which works to the same effect. In this context, a shared Judeo-Christian heritage is at times evoked to justify Western support. 

Effects and Implications     

One can question the relevance of a shared Judeo-Christian heritage—considering, for example, that Christianity is the birthplace of antisemitism. One can also point to the significant and positive contributions that Islam has made to European history, as well as to the diverse and predominantly peaceful nature of the creeds that make up Islam. Furthermore, one can show that many of Israel’s security threats are either self-made or self-perpetuated, and explain that terrorism and fighting to achieve self-determination are not the same thing as Menachim Begin himself noted with conviction and passion. 

However, facts struggle to sway emotive frames grounded in decades of political rhetoric about the ‘war on terror’, the ‘dangers of Islam’, and the ‘threat of refugees’ in a context of globalization that brings the ‘other’ closer without having brought promised prosperity to all. It is likely a more instructive undertaking to examine the implications of Europe’s semi-fascists supporting and repeating Israeli narratives and frames that justify occupation, and hence repressive violence. At least three are worth highlighting.

A first implication is that Europe’s semi-fascist political parties—and their voters—prolong the suffering of the Palestinian people. This simple observation calls the moral character of these parties into question. Briefly put, it suggests they are willing to support the idea of inflicting substantial angst and discomfort on out-groups that they view as standing in the way of a desire to create a more homogeneous society, whether defined in ethnic, racial, religious, or other exclusive terms. 

A side-effect of doing so is that Europe’s semi-fascist parties cause substantial harm to the continent’s global reputation because sizeable parts of the world views Israel’s occupation through the lenses of apartheid, genocide, and neocolonialism. There is an international cost to prioritizing Israeli interests and good bilateral relations over international law and human rights.

A second implication is the creation of new, longer-term risks to the Israeli state and the Jewish people in general. This is the case because European parties that strive for the restoration of nativist identities and homogeneous social structures seem to play a double game by using and amplifying accusations of antisemitism as a method to invalidate criticism of Israeli government policies and actions regarding occupation. 

After all, they support one out-group (e.g. Jewish citizens of Israel and Jewish citizens in their own countries) to demonize another out-group (e.g. Muslims the world over and Muslim refugees, residents, and citizens in their own countries). What is to say they will not tomorrow turn on today’s ‘friends’ from the same nativist mindset? 

Either way, transactional pragmatism currently dominates the relationship between Israeli ultra-nationalist/religious forces and European semi-fascist parties, as highlighted by Likud joining the Patriots for Europe grouping in the European Parliament as an observer in February 2025. Nevertheless, another problematic side-effect of using antisemitism accusations to support Israel’s occupation is that it degrades a real problem, namely violent racist incidents against Europe’s Jewish citizens.

A final implication of Europe’s semi-fascists supporting Israeli claims that justify occupation—and its authoritarian, repressive, and exclusive practices—is that they may follow this recipe themselves once in power, probably in diluted form. In other words, they may copy Israel’s strategy by seeking to manipulate democratic mechanisms, discourage dissent, and gradually exclude groups from society that are perceived as non-native. Hungary comes to mind as a more advanced example of such dynamics at work. 

In extremis, Europe’s semi-fascists seek an end of liberal democracy to create the society they prefer since there is, for now, no majority that actively supports their radical projects. Yet there might be a silent plurality or even majority that is willing to tolerate their (partial) realization. This happens to be precisely the trajectory upon which Israel’s ultra-nationalists and religious political forces seem to travel. They do so at a higher speed than Europe’s semi-fascists because they operate in a more violent physical environment even though this is in large part of their own making. The legal, repressive and violent exclusion of ‘the other’ that Israel’s ultra-nationalist/religious political forces practice internally and externally as a matter of course should serve as a warning to Europe’s citizens. The current situation in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank suggests it is a dangerous path to follow.