More than a month into Iran–U.S. negotiations over the former’s nuclear program, the talks between the two erstwhile enemies appear to have reached a critical stage, as the goals and red lines of both come into greater focus. The most recent fifth round of talks on May 23 at the Omani Embassy in Rome revealed that the Trump administration’s latest demand for “zero [uranium] enrichment” collides with the Islamic Republic’s proclaimed “red line” to keep its domestic nuclear infrastructure intact. However, what is not clear is the impact a new nuclear agreement would have on Iran’s ballistic missiles and its regional policy. 

Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a potential deal between the U.S. and Iran that falls short of addressing Israeli interests—especially in view of Tehran’s missile and nuclear challenges—will lead to sustainable security stabilization in the region. In the interim, the stakes for the Iranian regime could not be greater, as it not only faces massive economic and military pressures from the outside, but an unprecedented domestic economic crisis that could trigger another wave of popular uprisings against it. Case in point, a nationwide truckers strike has been going on since May 19. In other words, the Islamic Republic fears for its viability with a perfect storm ever darkening on the horizon, especially if a deal with Washington fails to materialize. 

Regime Red Lines and Sources of Power 

For the Islamic Republic, there are several red lines which are informing its negotiation stance or diplomatic dealings with the United States. In fact, these red lines underpin the regime’s sources of power (and its projection) and should, therefore, not be confused with red lines regarding the national interests and sovereignty of the Iranian people. As such, the regime in Iran has little maneuverability—except for cosmetic or temporary concessions—to cross any of the following red lines: 

(1) Keeping the nuclear program and its infrastructure, including domestic enrichment of uranium, in place. In regime jargon, this is often referred to as Iran’s “inalienable right” to a peaceful nuclear program as stipulated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The goal here is to allow Tehran to reactivate its “nuclear escalation” strategy, whenever the need arises, for leverage.  Tehran has used an expanding nuclear program and the concomitant threat of a nuclear-armed Iran to extract economic or geopolitical concessions in dealings with the West. Over the past two decades, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly pursued “nuclear escalation” with success, time and again forcing the West to the negotiating table, and securing sanctions relief or Western abandonment of a robust Iran policy. 

Against this backdrop, at the present time, as an Iranian official even openly admitted, Tehran wants to assure its ability to re-engage in “nuclear escalation” if need be, particularly in case Washington (under the present or next administration) reneges on its deal obligations. In recent years, Tehran has dramatically expanded its nuclear program, assembling enough fissile material to build a few nuclear bombs while significantly reducing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection regime. This situation led the IAEA Secretary-General Rafael Grossi to note that his Agency can no longer guarantee the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Given Tehran’s increased military and regional-power vulnerabilities and weaknesses since 2024, some in the ruling establishment believe turning the Islamic Republic into a nuclear-armed state would constitute the last remaining option to safeguard regime survival (although such hopes may be misplaced). However, if Iran today further pursues “nuclear escalation”, it may risk inviting Israeli and/or U.S. military action against its nuclear infrastructure.

Given these external pressures, today Tehran openly declares its intention to renounce nuclear weapons, as a basis for a nuclear deal. This is an ironic position for a state that has insisted that it is only pursuing a civilian nuclear program and that nuclear weapons are forbidden according to its Islamic credentials.      

(2) Keeping its missile program and infrastructure intact. Since the 2015 nuclear deal (the so-called Joint Comprehensive of Action, or JCPOA), Iran has considerably expanded its missile and drone programs. In 2024, it demonstrated its willingness—and ability—to launch 500 missiles in its two first-ever direct assaults against Israel. While the missiles were overwhelmingly intercepted by Israel, the United States, and some of the latter’s regional Arab partners, Tel Aviv fears that a next wave could be more devastating, as a large number of missiles at once could overwhelm its air-defense systems. More recently, on the day of U.S. President Donald Trump’s May 13 visit to Riyadh, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Hossein Salami, threatened Israel with the launch of 600 missiles, the bulk of which, in his view, could not be intercepted. Israeli experts assess that Iran has several hundred missiles left. In fact, Iran’s missile arsenal includes cruise as well as ballistic missiles. The latter, with a radius that even extends to parts of Europe, would reach Israel within minutes, while constituting the preferred delivery system for nuclear weapons. 

Against this backdrop, the Islamic Republic views its expanding missile program not only as its chief project of prestige (potentially now even replacing the stature attributed to the nuclear program) but also as a key factor to deter, intimidate or attack external foes, thereby serving as one of the key guarantees for its survival. 

(3) No limitations on Iranian support for the “Axis of Resistance” throughout the Middle East. While the Iran-led “Axis” suffered a historic defeat last year—in light of the decimation of Hezbollah and Hamas, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria (which served as a land bridge for Iranian weapons to the Levant)—Tehran still hopes to revitalize it. At the present stage, the only remnants of that “Axis” are pro-Iranian Shia militias in Iraq (the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF) and the Houthis in Yemen. As Iran tries to re-establish the strength of its regional-power network (as it currently is attempting to do in post-Assad Syria), it will not accept U.S. constraints and threats of military action enshrined in a potential deal. After all, for decades, the “Axis of Resistance” served as a primary means for Tehran’s power projection and leverage vis-à-vis the West. 

Now, as Iran’s regional power has become a shadow of its former self, Tehran views its missile program as its single most important remaining card, to be used as leverage in negotiations with the West. This logic was summarized by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on May 15 in statements to reporters in Tehran: “In fact, it is our defensive capabilities—the missiles of the Islamic Republic—that give strength and power to the negotiator to sit at the table, and it is these that cause the other side to give up and lose hope in a military attack.”  

U.S. Hardening Toward ‘Zero Enrichment’

Under Trump II, the goals of the administration’s Iran diplomacy and policy have been inconsistent and contradictory, with one camp (including Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Vice President J. D. Vance) favoring a nuclear deal only and another (including former National Security Advisory Mike Waltz and his successor as well as Secretary of State Marco Rubio) preferring a more comprehensive one that also addresses Iran’s ballistic-missile program and potentially its support for the “Axis”. In fact, the latter position is not only favored by so-called Iran hawks from the Republican Party but also—quite notably—by former Obama administration Secretary of State and JCPOA negotiator John Kerry. Both camps seem to rally behind the Trump II administration’s foreign-policy motto of “peace through strength”, a credo consistently stressed by Witkoff. 

Trump himself has made clear during the campaign for re-election and since returning to the White House that his single most important policy goal toward Tehran is to avoid a nuclear-armed Iran. This narrow focus on the nuclear issue has been particularly on display during the first two rounds of Iran–U.S. talks (mediated by Oman and taking place in Muscat on April 12 and at the Omani Embassy in Rome on April 19), and has echoed Tehran’s preference. In fact, for the Islamic Republic, the first aim in diplomacy with the U.S. is to keep the focus on the nuclear issue so as to avoid discussing its missile program and its regional policies. In that light, those two initial rounds of talks have from the Iranian perspective gone according to plan. 

However, moving into the third round of talks in Muscat on April 26, the gap between the two appeared in a clearer light. According to an Iranian official familiar with the talks, Tehran started seeing its missile program as a major sticking point in the negotiations. On the nuclear front, too, major sticking points were reported but little detail was provided. 

The major turn in the U.S. public position to demanding ‘zero enrichment’ occurred between the fourth (on May 11 in Muscat) and fifth rounds (May 23 in Rome)—much to Tehran’s consternation. In a May 18 interview, U.S. negotiator Witkoff insisted that Iran could not be allowed “even one percent of an enrichment capability”; maintaining a domestic enrichment capability would allow for weaponization, he argued. The same argument was laid down two days later by Rubio before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he insisted that Iran could, like other states, import enriched uranium for its civilian uses. In other words, the U.S. position appears to have seemingly overcome the above-sketched, long-assumed intra-administration Iran factionalism, converging into the central demand of ‘zero enrichment’ with no domestic enrichment capabilities left for Tehran. 

From the ‘Libyan model’ to ‘Zero Enrichment‘

Even beyond the figure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu aside, Israel has long made clear that it demanded the ‘Libyan model’ to be applied to the Islamic Republic—the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs with little to no related domestic infrastructures left thereof. This would, in fact, amount to nothing short of a wide-ranging military capitulation of the Iranian regime. If this can’t be reached through diplomacy, Israel maintains that it reserves the right to act militarily against Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructures, with or without U.S. involvement. In fact, such Israeli goals have been widely shared among the country’s political and military establishment given the experiences with Iran following October 7, 2023, as the Islamic Republic—with its regional “Axis” and missile program—evolved into a veritable, if not existential, threat given the small size of Israeli territory.   

In fact, ahead of the fourth, postponed round of talks between the United States and Iran on May 11 in Muscat, Israel’s Leader of the Opposition Yair Lapid announced “five basic principles that are necessary from Israel’s perspective”: 1) “zero” uranium enrichment; 2) removal of all enriched material from Iranian territory; 3) demolition of centrifuges; 4) dismantling the ballistic-missile program; and 5) close and unrestricted verification.     

At the same time, since April Netanyahu has signaled Israel’s minimum requirement for an Iran deal: namely, the total dismantlement of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program. Following Washington’s recent insistence on “zero enrichment”, he has reiterated that Israeli position. As such, U.S. and Israeli demands of Tehran ended up converging. The shifting Israeli position, meanwhile, may indeed have reflected the desire not to risk a rift over Iran given the Trump-Netanyahu estrangement. 

Main Points of Contention

The Nuclear Program

In the initial phase of the talks, a simple nuclear deal had been widely regarded as a strong possibility, with Iran having to merely renounce the militarization of its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Later, however, discord between the two sides over key details of a nuclear deal emerged. In Washington, there has been increasing talk of the necessity that Iran dismantle its nuclear program entirely, including abandoning domestic uranium enrichment efforts and instead importing the element. This new U.S. position now clearly collides with the above-described Iranian red lines, as Tehran insists on maintaining a civilian nuclear infrastructure on its territory. From the Iranian perspective, agreeing to the latest U.S. demands would deprive it from the last remaining bargaining chip it believes it possesses: its ability to restart “nuclear escalation” whenever necessary.     

The Missile Program

Short of the Israeli demand for total dismantlement of Iran’s missile program, there are additional pressures from a number of other actors.

The first focuses on rolling back the ballistic-missile program, including missile range. In the past, the Islamic Republic has on occasion suggested a willingness to limit the range—sparing Europe but not necessarily Israel. 

The second has to do with the prospect of Iran mounting nuclear warheads on its ballistic missiles. At the time of the third round of talks, several European diplomats suggested that they had advised U.S. negotiators that any comprehensive agreement with Tehran should include restrictions on developing or acquiring the capability to mount a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile. Meanwhile, Iran maintains that its missile program is non-negotiable and insists that it poses no threat to neighbors. This claim, however, contradicts recent history, not only regarding Israel but even Iran’s missile strikes in January 2024 against its immediate neighbors demonstrated. 

The ‘Axis of Resistance’

Given the dramatic unravelling of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ over the past year, the regional security challenge posed by this grouping has been partly—or is in the process of being—defused. Both Hezbollah and the PMF are embroiled in national processes that aim to either disarm them or bring them under control of their respective states’ armed forces, thereby removing them from the Iranian hard-power orbit. Hamas, for example, again finds itself under military pressure from Israel after the breakdown of the ceasefire on May 18 and Israel’s widely condemned assault on Gaza. 

The only remaining disruptive force within the ‘Axis’ have been the Houthis in Yemen, who faced escalating weeks-long aerial attacks by the United States to the cost of $1 billion. To everyone’s surprise, on May 6, Trump announced a ceasefire deal with the Houthis toward sparing U.S. ships from being targeted in the Red Sea, thereby following the Chinese and Russian model. In fact, in March 2024, Beijing and Moscow had reportedly reached agreements with the Yemeni movement pledging not to target their ships. As a result, these narrow, unilateral arrangements have left the Houthi threat to international shipping though the Bab el-Mandeb intact for others. 

In the meantime, the military confrontation between Israel and the Houthis escalated. On May 5, the Israeli Air Force launched a series of strikes targeting the Houthis’ main air and seaport facilities in the Red Sea port city of Al Hudaydah, aiming to disrupt the group’s logistics and supply lines. In retaliation, the Houthis on May 8 fired a long-range ballistic missile toward Israel, which struck near Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, temporarily disrupting international air traffic on May 8. It remains unclear at the time of going to print, how far the Houthi issue will be part of a potential U.S.–Iran deal, given the said Trump–Houthi arrangement and Tehran’s usual claim of deniability regarding its military support for the Houthis. As recently as May 12, reports indicated that Iran continued to try to ship weapons to the Houthis.

Trump Forced Tehran to the Negotiating Table

The Islamic Republic had initially opposed diplomacy with Trump. After all, throughout 2024, Tehran had suffered a series of major defeats: Israel had destroyed Iranian air defenses, leaving key regime infrastructures extremely vulnerable in the event of another Israeli attack, and its “Axis of Resistance” had lost core pillars (Hezbollah and Syria). Tehran has therefore lost key power leverages that it had once possessed for decades. Yet, in the face of Trump’s ever-mounting economic and military pressure, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei walked back his February emphasis that negotiations with Washington were “not logical, nor wise, nor honorable”, and soon rescinded his earlier categorical rejection of talks.

Economically, Trump has reimposed “maximum pressure” sanctions with the aim of driving Iranian exports to zero, in much the same approach following his unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018. On May 1, 2025, amid ongoing U.S.-Iran talks, he tightened the economic cord around the regime’s neck, as he publicly declared that any importer of Iranian oil will lose access to U.S. markets. This mimicked a threat he had successfully directed against China in 2018 that forced the latter to completely halt oil imports from Iran in November of that year. 

Militarily, prior to the start of Iran talks, Washington began a military build-up in the region, namely in Diego Garcia, a joint U.S.–UK base in the Indian Ocean. This was meant to underpin the military threat that Trump has consistently evoked in case of diplomacy failing, including U.S. air power that can hit Iran’s underground nuclear facilities with ‘bunker-busting’ bombs. In other words, the military pressure Iran faces emanates from both Israel and the U.S., posing a grave threat to its key infrastructures—nuclear,  missile, and energy. Such a scenario, the regime is aware, could destabilize it and even endanger its survival.

In short, the combination of these economic and military pressures and threats have forced Khamenei to agree to negotiations with the Trump administration.      

Consternation and Calculations in Tehran

But voices of concern and warnings from within the Iranian establishment have steadily increased from one round of negotiations to the next—culminating with the recent U.S. demand of zero enrichment.

This has hardened Khamenei’s and the Foreign Ministry’s defiance, both warning that under such conditions negotiations are doomed to fail. In fact, the May 24 edition of the IRGC-affiliated daily Javan provided insights into the establishment’s read of the talks’ trajectory and what it sees being at stake. 

Its title story, one day following the fifth round of talks, stated that Washington’s ‘zero enrichment’ demand had complicated and slowed down negotiations, with a controversy now raging over enrichment—Tehran’s critical “red line”. An editorial titled “Why is enrichment a red line?” laid out the different purposes of the levels of enrichment, from civilian to military. It then did not mince words when arguing that “there is no reason not to use nuclear technology as a deterrent and authority-building element”, with “nuclear technology” being “a component of national power” to confront “enemies and political rivals” from deploying sanctions and other pressure on the Islamic Republic. 

Clearly, Iran’s regime wants to retain domestic enrichment capacity not only to restart “nuclear escalation” when deemed necessary but also as an option toward weaponization. In reality, however, Tehran’s nuclear program has consumed a tremendous amount of the country’s human, financial, and political resources, with enrichment being neither economically sound nor an expression of 21st-century technological advancement, as former IAEA advisor and nuclear expert Behrooz Bayat has consistently laid out. 

Diplomatic Failure: Risks of Survival

Despite the steadfast tone of defiance, the Islamic Republic cannot afford a collapse of the talks. Walking away from the negotiations risks inviting a new level of economic and military pressures, which would threaten the regime’s survival, the single most important objective of Iran’s leadership. Economically, U.S. pressure on Iranian oil revenues could intensify; even comprehensive UN sanctions risk being reimposed. In a significant detour from its previous quasi-appeasement toward Tehran, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) has threatened to activate the JCPAO’s “snapback” mechanism, which would automatically reimpose such sanctions, if no deal is forged by August. Militarily, there is also the risk of Israeli and/or U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear and ballistic-missile sites on the heels of collapsed negotiations. Time is running out for Tehran to forge a deal with Trump if it wants to avoid a nightmare scenario which could unhinge the regime’s hold on power.

Even more crucially, such a scenario may precipitate another popular uprising against the regime—amid what I call a long-term revolutionary process in Iran—triggered by an aggravated economic crisis bordering on chaos and collapse in particular, and a deterioration of widespread public discontent, in general.   

A foretaste of this can already be witnessed: a nationwide strike by truck drivers in protest over escalating economic pressures and government neglect has gripped the country, threatening Iran’s supply chains. Tellingly, the truckers’ strike started on May 19 in Bandar Abbas, the major city near Rajaee Port where on April 26 a huge explosion killed several drivers and left the injured frustrated over the lack of government support. Instead, the establishment has tried to contain the strikes, mainly through suppression (including arrests). 

In fact, the port explosion amounted to an economic shock, occurring amid the most severe post-revolution economic crisis. The detonation of 10,000 containers at Iran’s ‘golden gateway’, the critically important international-trade hub of Rajaee Port near Bandar Abbas along the Persian Gulf and near the Strait of Hormuz, occurred on the day the third round of U.S.–Iran talks began.

 The port explosion has a chilling link to the missile program: The containers contained chemicals imported from China earlier this year to be used for the production of solid-fueled ballistic missiles, and were part of Tehran’s critical strategy to rearm after Israel had destroyed Iranian missile-production facilities in its October 2024 aerial assault. 

In fact, according to Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization, the port handles a whopping 85–90% of the country’s container trade and more than half of its total trade. To downplay the true extent of the incident, some Iranian officials falsely claimed that merely 15% of the nation’s container trade had gone through that port. In fact, the port explosion is not only an economic shock whose macro- and socio-economic ramifications will be unfolding in the near to medium future, but also raises crucial security-related questions: Why were the containers carrying military chemicals not declared as such and are these security liabilities the norm at that port and potentially others? Was the explosion a result from sabotage? These security dimensions also cast a shadow on potential post-deal investments in Iran, given the central role the Rajaee Port is playing in this regard.

Now, amid the ever-widening truckers’ strike, the Supreme National Security Council (SCSC)—an élite body tasked with regime security and enjoying overriding powers—for the second time after September 2024 intervened to block the implementation of a December 2023 legislation tightening the hijab laws. The timing suggests the regime fears that its security forces may be overstretched if faced with both strikes and a renewed upheaval à la 2022’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement that had marked the erstwhile culmination of the still-raging revolutionary process.  

Tehran’s Counter-strategy

The Islamic Republic’s concerns about the negotiations are also reflected in its iron will to control the domestic narrative surrounding them. As such, officials and state media insisted that Witkoff’s premature departure during the fifth round in Rome was due to his alleged need to “catch a flight”. In reality, Trump’s Middle East Special Envoy is known to use his private jet for his government duties, translating into a relatively flexible flight schedule. This regime narrative demonstrates the fear and dangers associated with admitting the failure of that round. After all, the SNSC continues to impose a media ban on reporting about details of the talks with Washington, especially forbidding Iranian domestic media from referring to foreign-media coverage. 

Therefore, crucially, Tehran will try to drag diplomacy on in a delicate balancing act to protect its red lines while avoiding the collapse of the talks. The underpinning hope is that the longer diplomacy lasts, the more likely the possibility to see U.S. demands softened.

Key in this regard is the attempt to offer tactical concessions of a cosmetic and temporary rather than substantive and permanent nature, potentially translating into a temporary deal. This could include a confidence-building ‘zero enrichment’ period to avert the dismantling of its nuclear infrastructure. According to a May 15 The Guardian report, Omani mediators proposed to Araghchi that Iran accept a three-year period of ‘zero enrichment’, after which it would revert to the 2015 JCPOA’s 3.67% level. In the interim, Moscow would provide Iran with the enriched uranium it needs for its civilian projects. More recently, according to a May 28 Reuters report, Iranian official sources suggested that Tehran may halt uranium enrichment for one year, ship part of its highly enriched stock abroad, or convert it into fuel plates for civilian nuclear purposes. In return, Washington would release frozen Iranian funds and recognize Tehran’s right to refine uranium for civilian purposes. Such a ‘political deal’ could lead to a broader nuclear accord, the sources suggested. Yet, prior to the next, sixth round of talks, even this one-year pause has been publicly rejected by Iran’s Foreign Ministry. In fact, these scenarios would depend on Trump’s flexibility and his ability to portray such a deal as a victory, despite likely opposition from elements within the U.S. establishment and from Israel.

At the same time, Iran continues to issue counterthreats to ward off military and economic pressures, by threatening Israel with a missile barrage that overwhelms its air defenses, and Europe with veiled threats in case of the activation of the JCPOA’s ‘snapback’ mechanism.

Moreover, there are indications that Tehran may once again flaunt its ‘negative power’ in the Gulf, probably with the aim of pressuring Arab Gulf states to lobby Washington for a softer Iran policy. On May 20, for instance, a Panama-flagged Emirati tanker in the Persian Gulf was “hijacked” by a ship from the Iranian shadow fleet that is operated by the IRGC. In fact, following Trump’s 2018 JCPOA withdrawal, Tehran had pursued a dual strategy whose replication today carries more risks than then: On one hand, ‘nuclear escalation’ (though today this could provoke strikes against its nuclear infrastructure), and on the other, targeting UAE and Saudi energy infrastructures with a series of sabotage operations and drone attacks. This culminated in September 2019 in the Houthis’ successful drone attack at the heart of Saudi oil production, which managed to halve it. The existential vulnerability of these states’ economic models has since become traumatic, which paved the way for Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to seek rapprochement with Tehran over the past few years.

In addition, Tehran may hope that differences between Trump’s and Netanyahu’s policies over Iran will reappear. In fact, before the recent overlapping of the United States and Israel in terms of ‘zero enrichment’, there have been signs of a Trump–Netanyahu divergence on some Middle Eastern conflicts. For instance, Israel was caught off-guard by Trump’s announcements about the start of Iran talks during Netanyahu’s visit to the Oval Office on April 7 and his ceasefire deal with the Houthis, which incidentally didn’t deter their attacks on Israel. It is not entirely clear whether Trump opposes Israeli military action against Iran in general or only temporarily as long as talks with Tehran are ongoing. 

At the same time, there have also been voices within the Iranian foreign-policy establishment, such as Mostafa Zahrani, the former head of the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s think-tank, to de facto use the inexperienced figure of Witkoff to strike a “comprehensive” deal with Washington. However, this is likely to mean that one would address all issues (nuclear, missiles, and regional policies) in a temporary or cosmetic rather than fundamental and irreversible fashion—given the earlier noted sources-of-power dimensions of those Iranian programs and policies.  

Last but not least, in contrast to past instances of Iran’s diplomatic exchanges, it is not clear what the exact bargain this time will be: as per JCPOA, this has been nuclear de-escalation (a significant reduction of the nuclear program while allowing Iran the right to enrich uranium at 3.67% on its own soil) in return for sanctions relief. Today, the latter component may be replaced by pressure relief (both economic and military), while the United States may allow Iran access to its frozen assets abroad, including $6 billion parked in Qatar. 

Devil in the Details 

In the wake of the fifth round of talks on May 31, the United States delivered a first formal proposal for a deal to Iran via Oman. According to some reports, in contrast to its ‘zero enrichment’ demand, Washington had suddenly allowed for some limited low-level Iranian domestic enrichment, similar to the 2015 JCPOA cap of 3.67%. At the same time, Iran would not be allowed to build any new enrichment facilities, “dismantle critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium,” stop new research and development on centrifuges, while placing its nuclear program under a “strong system for monitoring and verification”—including accepting the IAEA’s Additional Protocol that allows for snap inspections—under the control of the IAEA and the United States.  Meanwhile, a regional enrichment consortium would be created—probably supervised by Washington and with the participation of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye—as a way to provide Tehran with enriched uranium for other civil purposes beyond the allowed 3% level. As for U.S. concessions, the extent and timing of sanctions relief remains unclear.   

However, as the exact nature of those provisions is not clear, the devil will be in the details. First, a key sticking point pertains to the duration and extent of limitations placed on Iran’s domestic nuclear program. Second, as to the consortium, Iran would insist that enrichment also takes place on its own soil. Against this backdrop, Tehran fears the proposal could end up in a significant and perhaps durable dismantlement of its nuclear program, and top Iranian figures have already signalled their opposition to such a deal. Khamenei has already condemned the U.S. proposal as “rude and arrogant”.

As Tehran’s nuclear red line in terms of domestic uranium enrichment and its infrastructure remains endangered, it will likely table a proposal of its own and try to save the talks from collapse. In the meantime, the U.S. position has seemingly reverted to its characteristic inconsistencies. The above-sketched U.S. proposal has also attracted harsh criticisms, from inside the U.S. Congress and Israel, fearing Trump may concede too much vis-à-vis Tehran. At the same time, a recent IAEA report about secret Iranian nuclear activities could prepare the ground for increasing international pressure on Tehran.    

In sum, the U.S.–Iran talks carry tremendous stakes for all actors involved, whether present at the negotiating table or not, like Israel, Europe, the Arab Gulf states. Not least is Iranian society which is held hostage to the regime’s priority to ensure its survival by all means necessary. 

For the Islamic Republic—finding itself in a position of historic geopolitical and economic vulnerability—the talks involve gigantic risks, with the realistic scenario of major regime destabilization. The outcome, however, hinges largely on the Trump administration, given the formidable military and economic tools still at its disposal, and the vagaries of a U.S. president whose erratic decision-making injects significant uncertainty into a high-stakes process.