The ongoing U.S.–Israeli war on Iran has triggered one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts in West Asia in decades. While the war on Iran has been publicly justified by the United States as an attempt to thwart Iran’s nuclear program, the strategic trajectory of events increasingly suggests a broader political objective. Across the region, many policymakers are reaching a growing conclusion: the central driver of the war is not the nuclear issue but instead to redraw the map and alliances of the Middle East—a project long associated with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vision of “Greater Israel.”

This perception is reinforced by a longer historical pattern. In 2007, former NATO commander Wesley Clark revealed that shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Pentagon officials discussed a plan to reshape the Middle East by targeting seven countries: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. Over the past two decades, each of these countries—except Iran—has experienced direct military intervention, regime change operations, or prolonged destabilization. Iraq was invaded in 2003; Libya collapsed after the 2011 NATO intervention; Syria endured a devastating civil war; and Lebanon, Sudan, and Somalia have faced persistent external pressure and internal fragmentation. Iran now appears as the final state in that sequence. For many regional observers, this pattern reinforces the view that the present war represents the culmination of a broader strategic agenda to reshape the regional balance of power.

Within this context, the nuclear issue has increasingly appeared as a pretext rather than the principal cause of the conflict. International monitoring repeatedly confirmed that Iran’s nuclear program remained under extensive international oversight, yet negotiations were repeatedly interrupted by escalating military pressure. Notably, officials directly involved in the diplomatic process acknowledged that negotiations had been making substantial progress. 

Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, the foreign minister of Oman (which hosted the talks between United States and Iran) as well as Jonathon Powell, the national security adviser of the United Kingdom publicly confirmed that the discussions had achieved “significant progress” and that a deal appeared within reach. Both officials also reportedly expressed surprise at the sudden U.S. military strike on Iran while diplomacy was advancing. 

For the first time since the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, two nuclear-armed states attacked a non-nuclear-weapon state, creating a dangerous precedent that undermines the global nonproliferation regime. Regrettably, neither the United Nations Security Council nor the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) condemned the U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities—which were protected under IAEA’s Safeguard Agreement—despite the strikes’ inconsistency with international law. 

Moreover, the recent strikes near nuclear sites in Iran such as the Bushehr plant—an integral part of Iran’s civilian energy program—raised fears of radiological disaster, with the IAEA warning that a direct hit on such facilities could cause severe cross-border radioactive release. Iran’s retaliation near Dimona, home to Israel’s nuclear complex, further normalizes targeting nuclear-adjacent sites and risks rapid escalation. 

This cycle heightens the danger of nuclear catastrophe while eroding trust in the NPT, as states may conclude that remaining non-nuclear no longer guarantees security and could pursue stronger deterrent capabilities in response. The result would fuel proliferation pressures. Moreover, contradictory statements by Director General of the IAEA Rafael Grossi are unhelpful: he acknowledged “Iran has no structured program to build nuclear weapons”, implying no justification for war, yet later suggested “only nuclear war can destroy Iran’s nuclear ambitions”. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister responded: “[The] IAEA chief has done nothing constructive regarding Iran and has instead repeatedly worsened tensions through harmful public statements.”

More broadly, the war has accelerated a strategic rethinking among major regional powers. The growing perception that the region could descend into deeper fragmentation—or even collapse—has prompted new discussions about regional cooperation. Countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan increasingly recognize that the erosion of regional order could ultimately threaten their own security and strategic autonomy. If the balance of power continues to shift decisively toward Israel’s military dominance, the consequences could extend far beyond the immediate battlefield, affecting the entire political structure of the Middle East.

An Opportunity for Egypt-Iran Cooperation

In this environment, Egypt and Iran have begun cautiously exploring a new diplomatic trajectory. Their relationship has been marked by four decades of estrangement since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. Yet the current geopolitical crisis is creating incentives for pragmatic engagement, especially since Iran announced in February that Cairo and Tehran have decided to exchange ambassadors in a move toward restoring full bilateral relations. 

Both countries possess deep historical influence, large populations, and significant diplomatic reach across the region. Their renewed dialogue reflects not merely bilateral normalization but a broader attempt to stabilize a region undergoing profound strategic disruption.

Egypt occupies a unique diplomatic position. As the most populous Arab state and a long-standing mediator in regional conflicts, Cairo maintains relations with diverse actors—from Western powers to regional governments and Palestinian factions. Iran, meanwhile, remains a central geopolitical actor with influence across several regional arenas. Cooperation between these two states therefore carries symbolic as well as strategic significance. Their renewed engagement could serve as the foundation for a new framework of regional cooperation, especially given their shared historical significance as great ancient civilizations and their influence on the political and cultural development of the broader Middle East.     

Additionally, Egypt has strong economic and political incentives to encourage dialogue between Iran and the United States, particularly in support of a ceasefire. Rising energy prices and disruptions to regional trade routes—especially those affecting shipping through the Red Sea and Suez Canal—have placed additional pressure on Egypt’s already fragile economy. Stability in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East directly affects Egyptian revenues from energy imports, maritime transit, and tourism. 

At the same time, Cairo has gained diplomatic momentum from hosting ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas and may seek to reinforce its role as a central regional mediator by offering to host Iran–U.S. talks as well. Successfully facilitating such negotiations would strengthen Egypt’s diplomatic standing and reaffirm Cairo’s traditional role as a key broker in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Cooperation between Egypt and Iran has historically been limited by ideological and geopolitical tensions following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, as well as Egypt’s close strategic partnership with the United States and peace treaty with Israel. However, changing regional dynamics—including shifting alliances, economic pressures, and pragmatic leadership in both capitals—have created new incentives for cautious engagement. 

Nonetheless, obstacles remain. Differences over regional alignments, Iran’s relations with non-state actors, and concerns among Arab partners could complicate a full normalization of ties. The United States also remains an important factor in Egypt’s strategic calculations. While Washington might tolerate limited diplomatic engagement between Cairo and Tehran if it helps reduce regional tensions, it could remain cautious about any relationship perceived as strengthening Iran’s regional influence or undermining Israel’s security. Consequently, Egypt is likely to pursue a careful, incremental approach that balances its economic and diplomatic interests with its longstanding security partnership with the United States.

The war has therefore created both danger and opportunity. On the one hand, continued escalation risks plunging the region into prolonged instability, encouraging arms races and deepening political fragmentation. On the other, the crisis is pushing regional powers to reconsider long-standing divisions and explore mechanisms for collective stability.

A sustainable regional order will likely require several major strategic adjustments.

First, Egypt and Iran must lay the groundwork for a durable strategic partnership. As two of the most significant historical civilizations and geopolitical actors in the Middle East, their cooperation could provide the intellectual and diplomatic foundation for a new regional architecture. Their engagement should emphasize dialogue, economic cooperation, and coordinated diplomacy aimed at reducing conflict and strengthening regional autonomy.

Second, any new regional framework must gradually include other major regional powers such as Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. These countries possess significant demographic, military, and economic capabilities and share a common interest in preventing further regional fragmentation. A cooperative structure among these states could help restore strategic balance and promote long-term stability.

Third, a durable regional order cannot emerge without addressing the Palestinian issue. Israel must ultimately accept a genuine political settlement based on the internationally recognized Two-State Solution. Without resolving the Palestinian crisis, cycles of violence will continue to destabilize the region and undermine broader diplomatic initiatives.

Finally, the role of the United States remains essential. Washington has long been a central external actor in the Middle East, but supporting a sustainable regional order will require a more balanced approach from the United States. Rather than pursuing unilateral strategies, the United States should cooperate with other major international powers and support regional diplomatic initiatives aimed at stability and conflict resolution.

The Middle East is now entering a period of profound transformation. The war on Iran has exposed the fragility of the existing regional order and the limitations of military solutions. At the same time, it has created new incentives for regional powers to rethink their relationships and build cooperative frameworks capable of preventing further collapse.

If Egypt and Iran can translate their cautious rapprochement into a broader regional dialogue—one that includes other major powers and addresses the underlying political conflicts of the region—they may help lay the foundations for a new strategic equilibrium. Such an effort would not only reduce the risks of further wars but could also open a path toward a more stable and balanced Middle East.