Democracy is fragile in the best of times and becomes extremely delicate during war, civil unrest, occupation, or other turbulence. To continue having the moral high ground which has—and rightfully so—garnered Ukraine allies of every sort all around the world—from large nations that send weapons, to civil society activists and individuals who write in favour of Ukraine or take in refugees—it is vital Ukraine does not fall into the trappings of rampant nationalism, xenophobia, and hate against its largest minority: Russians.

From almost 44 million Ukrainian citizens, 17.3 percent (or over 8 million people) identify as Russian. Some have been living on the territory of Ukraine for centuries and it’s quite hard to find families that do not have any Russian-speaking ancestors, especially the further east you go. This connection to Russia does not and should not disqualify them from being Ukrainian. Just as Croatian Serbs are a minority that has lived on the territory of today’s Croatia for centuries and are full-fledged Croatian citizens entitled to the same rights as ethnic Croats—despite the justified War of Independence in Croatia—the same principle applies to the Ukrainian Russian minority, who, regardless of historical or cultural ties to Russia, remain an integral part of the Ukrainian nation and citizenry.

“The EU has worked hard to tame European nationalism—but the pull of national belonging runs deep. As Kyiv makes its way into Europe, both Ukraine and countries across the continent will need to resist the pull of ethnonationalism and instead channel nationalist impulses into a civic patriotism,” Michael Kimmage writes for The Foreign Affairs Magazine, referring to the fact that the EU has agreed to start negotiations to allow Ukraine to eventually join the Union.

Unfortunately, the voices against ‘ordinary’ Russians in Ukraine are louder and becoming more prominent. A colleague of mine was present during a large literary event where a Ukrainian official openly said that “there is no future for Ukraine as long as one ethnic Russian lives within its borders”.

While pitching this very article to a news outlet that prides itself of its Ukrainian-Atlantic relations and democratic views I was told that the “issue of the Russians of Donbas during the re-integration will be dealt with in another way”. Later I received messages from the investor of the news outlet (who hides his last name) that I am a “Russian” or “Russian player”. To us who witness the conflict from the sidelines, it is becoming obvious that anti-minority feelings are peaking.

Equally, while working on evacuating civilians from the war-torn eastern Donbas region, an acquaintance who works in one of the EU institutions texted me that I am “committing treason and wasting my time, as those people deserve to stay there, they are Russian”. How can Ukraine pursue a future which claims to uphold a moral defence of democracy while abandoning and demonizing its largest minority? Developing a federal state, which would allow for power sharing between the different regions and ethnicities of the country, perhaps may be the best option for Ukraine.

Federalism: An Unpopular Term

Russia has long exploited the concept of federalism to destabilize Ukraine, using it as a tool to push for regional autonomy in eastern regions as a precursor to secession. In the Ukrainian context, federalism is highly unpopular and widely viewed with suspicion, in part because it has historically been promoted by external actors—primarily Russia—as a means to fragment the country. Unlike in the United States, where federalism is seen as a democratic arrangement balancing state and federal power, in Ukraine the term has become associated with foreign interference and the weakening of national unity. 

This process began in earnest in 2004, during Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, when Moscow-backed politicians warned that the rise of pro-European leaders would marginalize Russian-speaking populations in the east and south. Russia claimed that offenses, such as discrimination against the Russian language, the imposition of nationalist historical narratives, and the curtailment of Orthodox religious institutions loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate, were being committed. These accusations intensified after the 2010 election of Viktor Yanukovych and exploded following his ousting in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and supported separatists in the Donbas under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians and promoting ‘federalization’.

This has become particularly evident in the Donbas region—comprising Donetsk and Luhansk—where, following the 2014 Maidan Revolution, pro-Russian separatists, with direct backing from Moscow, declared self-proclaimed ‘people’s republics’. Russia used the rhetoric of federalism and local self-rule to legitimize these breakaway entities, all while deploying military support and waging hybrid war. For many Ukrainians, this reinforced the belief that calls for federalism were merely a smokescreen for Kremlin-backed partition.

A Solution for Ukraine?

As a result, “federalism” has become a taboo word in Ukraine. But could it be time to reconsider? Russia has most certainly used it to excuse its decades of interference in Ukraine—even before its all-out invasion began in 2014—as defending the rights of ethnic Russians whose language, economic opportunities, and religious identity were supposedly being crushed by post-Communist Ukrainian nationalism.

Ukraine is a democracy that scores high on indexes of linguistic and ethnic diversity—based on the inhabitants’ preferred everyday language, geopolitical orientation, and memory politics. Countries with so much diversity are often federal states, where political authority is divided between two autonomous governments, one national and the other subnational or regional. 

Examples include Canada, where French-speaking Quebec enjoys cultural and legislative autonomy; Belgium, which is divided along linguistic lines between Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia; and Switzerland, a country with four national languages and a long-standing tradition of cantonal self-governance. These federal arrangements allow diverse populations to coexist within a single national framework by accommodating regional differences in language, culture, and political priorities.

But thanks to Russia’s historical misuse of federalization for its own agenda to destabilise Ukraine, ‘federalism’ has become a taboo word in the war-torn country, so much so that many journalists and intellectuals simply will not discuss it.

Dr. Soeren Keil, formerly of the Institute of Federalism at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and a leading expert on federalism as a conflict resolution tool, says federalism can potentially help Ukraine ease tensions between its Russian (and other) minorities and the Ukrainian majority. Keil explains why people are wary to pursue federalism, given Ukraine’s history.

“Federalism is used by pro-Russian actors to promote regional autonomy in the East, which ultimately is targeted at supporting the separation and secession of Eastern territories from Ukraine. Therefore, it is difficult to use the f-word,” Keil says. However, he emphasises that oftentimes it is important to overcome historical worries and think about new ways of solving old problems.

Only the Ukrainian people and lawmakers can decide if federalism will help resolve ethnic tensions—Ukrainians must think about how to accommodate and protect diverse regional identities within a democratic state. A federal model could offer a framework to integrate regional groups while preserving national unity. 

For this to work, Dr. Keil emphasizes a tailored approach rooted in Ukraine’s unique context. Strengthening decentralization efforts could expand Ukraine’s existing systems by granting regional governments more autonomy over areas such as education, culture, and local governance. This decentralization would empower regions without undermining the central government’s authority.

“This is important for societal peace and in line with Ukraine’s international obligations as a member of the Council of Europe and the OSCE,” says Keil. Liberating occupied territory from Russia and its proxies is not enough to secure a peaceful future for Ukraine, he explains. Ukraine must begin thinking how to peacefully reintegrate the Russian occupied regions of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk.

Keil says federalism can work anywhere and says he’s confident that it can also take root in Ukraine, where past attempts at decentralisation have already created strong municipalities and regional governments.

Keil states that there are many mechanisms to create a viable and respected federal system, noting that these include “representative regional second chambers, appointing ministers from different regions, or ensuring some kind of proportional representation of different groups and regions”.

A Pathway Forward

If there is a federal solution in Ukraine, which Keil calls “a big if”, then it must be based on a Ukrainian solution that fits the situation in the country, he says. International support will be critical for Ukraine to design a federal system tailored to its needs. Western democracies with successful federal models, like Germany or Switzerland, can provide technical expertise and guidance for constitutional reforms. 

The EU and international donors should tie financial aid to inclusive governance reforms, Keil recommends, encouraging policies that promote interethnic collaboration and regional autonomy within the framework of national unity. Monitoring by international organizations could also ensure fair implementation of federal arrangements and foster trust among skeptical communities.

According to Keil, to build a sustainable framework for federalism, Ukraine must also prioritize the creation of independent institutions to mediate potential regional disputes and oversee equitable resource distribution. Establishing an impartial federal court system to resolve intergovernmental conflicts will be key to ensuring trust in the system. Furthermore, Ukraine could explore granting financial autonomy to its regions by allowing localized tax collection and budget management under strict transparency guidelines. 

This would help address economic disparities, often a source of regional dissatisfaction. In tandem, fostering interregional cooperation through infrastructure projects, cultural exchange programs, and economic incentives could build solidarity and weaken secessionist tendencies. International partnerships, particularly with entities like the EU, should emphasize long-term institutional capacity-building to ensure resilience against internal and external destabilization efforts, he concludes.

“There are a lot of institutional possibilities, what is important is that the situation in Ukraine is analysed in detail, that compromises are forged between those seeking autonomy and those preferring centralisation, and that a solution is implemented that is in line with Ukraine’s constitutional history, its institutional experiences, and connected to its international obligations,” says Keil.

Still, the challenges of rebuilding Ukraine as a federal state after the war with Russia ends are significant, he says.

“Federalism would require a complete constitutional revision and a shift away from the belief in the central state. Instead, it would be based on power-sharing and power-division between different levels of government. That requires a lot of constitutional discussions, institutional changes, and a whole new way of thinking,” Keil explains.

A legal framework, though, is just the beginning of what Ukraine will need once the war is over, Keil states. Refugees need to return, vast areas need to rebuild, and democratic elections need to be held. “This all should substantially lower the risk of secession,” he says.

Will Federalism Work?

Keil says the success of federalism is hard to measure objectively. Federalism has worked in some countries, he explains. In Bosnia, it contributed to peacebuilding after the 1995 Dayton Accords by establishing a complex but functional power-sharing arrangement between the country’s main ethnic groups—Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. 

In Ethiopia, federalism was introduced in 1995 to accommodate the country’s diverse ethnic groups and promote autonomy through a system of “ethnic federalism”. However, Keil notes that while the idea was to hold the multinational state together through inclusivity, the lack of proper federal implementation—alongside growing centralization and ethnic tensions—has severely undermined these goals. 

Iraq offers yet another model: although its federal system is dysfunctional in many respects, it has allowed Shia, Kurdish, and other minority politicians to participate in decision-making and have their rights formally protected, showing that even flawed federal structures can offer a degree of representation in divided societies.

Ukraine and Russia share a substantial amount of history, culture, religion, economics, and societal experiences. They were part of the same country—the Soviet Union—for many decades. However, this does not mean that Ukrainian is not a truly separate identity, states Keil.

“The current Russian aggression has really strengthened and solidified a sense of Ukrainian identity and separateness from Russia and the Russian cultural sphere,” Keil explains. Over time, he says, democratic changes in Russia can launch a new era in which Ukraine and Russia, but also countries such as Belarus and Moldova, can look dispassionately at their shared culture and identity, as well as what makes them unique.

 “A country is never just influenced by one part of its identity, history, or language. Countries are multifaceted, multidimensional, and change over time,” states Keil. For Ukraine, rebuilding after the war and laying the foundations for an enduring peace will be difficult. “But it will not be impossible, as the development in post-World War 2 Germany and Japan has highlighted,” he concludes.

Soeren Keil is a Senior Teaching and Research Fellow at the University of Passau in Germany. He works in the field of International Politics with a special focus on institution-building in post-conflict societies. He has published widely on federalism, conflict resolution and EU integration with a regional specialization on the Western Balkans. He has worked as an adviser to several international organisations and governments.